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Police Unions
Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson*
ABSTRACT
No issue has been more controversial in the discussion of police union
responses to allegations of excessive force than statutory and contractual protections for officers accused of misconduct, as critics assail such protections
and police unions defend them. For all the public controversy over police unions, there is relatively little legal scholarship on them. Neither the legal nor
the social science literature on policing and police reform has explored the
opportunities and constraints that labor law offers in thinking about organizational change. The scholarly deficit has substantial public policy consequences, as groups ranging from Black Lives Matter to the U.S. Department
of Justice are proposing legal changes that will require the cooperation of police labor organizations to implement. This Article fills that gap.
Part I explores the structure and functioning of police departments and
the evolution of police unions as a response to a hierarchical and autocratic
command structure. Part II examines how and why police unions have been
obstacles to reform, focusing particularly on union defense of protections for
officers accused of misconduct. Part III describes and analyzes instances in
which cities have implemented reforms to reduce police violence and improve
police-community relations over fifty years. All of them involved the cooperation of the rank-and-file, and many involved active cooperation with the
union. Part IV proposes mild changes in the law governing police labor relations to facilitate rank-and-file support of the kinds of transparency, accountability, and constitutional policing practices that police reformers have been
advocating for at least a generation. We propose a limited form of minority
union bargaining—a reform that has been advocated in other contexts by both
the political left and the political right at various points in recent history—to
create an institutional structure enabling diverse representatives of police rankand-file to meet and confer with police management over policing practices.
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INTRODUCTION
A major law and policy debate shaping the contemporary landscape of racial inequality today concerns police, whom critics assail as
a major source of racial inequity and whose unions are said to be the
major obstacle to reform. Critics often cite a recent instance in which
a police officer who engaged in appalling misconduct escapes firing or
discipline through the intervention of a union or by invoking a statutory or contractual job protection. The many recent instances of police
killing civilians—when Darren Wilson shot Michael Brown in Fergu-
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son, Missouri,1 or when Daniel Pantaleo choked Eric Garner to death
on a Staten Island street,2 or when Baltimore police officers killed
Freddie Gray while driving him to jail,3 or when Peter Liang shot Akai
Gurley in the stairwell of a New York apartment building,4 or when
Jeronimo Yanez shot Philando Castile during a traffic stop in suburban St. Paul,5 or when Jeffrey Cook and Omar Thyme shot Alexia
Christian in the back of an Atlanta police car,6 or when five police
officers shot and killed Kisha Michael in her car while she was unconscious7—have sparked calls to fire and prosecute the officers involved,
and outrage at the difficulty and delays in doing so and at the union’s
resistance to summary discipline. People rightly wonder why the
union conceives of its obligation as protecting cops who appear to
have engaged in clear misconduct rather than protecting the interests
of “good” ones by allowing “bad” ones to be disciplined, fired, or
prosecuted. Under this analysis, public employee unions are a major
impediment to the kinds of reforms that would eliminate pervasive
racism toward people of color and the urban poor.8
For their part, many rank-and-file police officers see the union as
an important protection against endemic arbitrariness in discipline. As
1 Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES: Q&A (Aug. 10,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-af
ter-police-shooting.html.
2 Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died from Chokehold During
Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/nyregion/
staten-island-man-died-from-officers-chokehold-autopsy-finds.html?smid=pl-share.
3 Joshua Barajas, Freddie Gray’s Death Ruled a Homicide, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (May 1, 2015, 1:50 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/freddie-grays-deathruled-homicide/.
4 Pervaiz Shallwani & Thomas MacMillan, NYPD Officer Pleads Not Guilty in Shooting
Death of Unarmed Man, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015, 9:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nypdofficer-surrenders-after-indictment-in-death-of-unarmed-man-1423668909.
5 Camila Domonoske & Bill Chappell, Minnesota Governor Calls Traffic Stop Shooting
‘Absolutely Appalling at All Levels,’ NPR: THE TWO-WAY (July 7, 2016, 7:19 AM), http://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/07/485066807/police-stop-ends-in-black-mans-deathaftermath-is-livestreamed-online-video.
6 Christian Boone, No Charges for Officers Who Shot Woman in Back of Patrol Car,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (July 15, 2016, 9:07 PM), http://www.myajc.com/news/crime—law/chargesfor-officers-who-shot-woman-back-patrol-car/V519PgmXsxe48f9cmhwuqL/.
7 Angel Jennings, A Mother Was Fatally Shot 13 Times in Inglewood. But the Police
Watchdog Group Has Barely Even Met, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016, 4:05 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-inglewood-police-oversight-20160906-snap-story.html.
8 Similar criticisms have been leveled at teachers’ unions, and for similar reasons. See
generally Daniel M. Rosenthal, Public Sector Collective Bargaining, Majoritarianism, and Reform, 91 OR. L. REV. 673 (2013) (describing criticisms of teachers’ unions). We focus on police
unions in this Article, leaving to others to consider the extent to which our analysis and our
proposal might be appropriate for other public sector employees.
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we discuss in Part II, police union leaders believe they are legally and
morally obliged to advocate for their members, including those accused of misconduct, and to resist efforts to strengthen the power of
management to discipline officers. In part because union leaders are
elected by the membership, many are reluctant to publicly question
the legality of their members’ behavior, and some dismiss criticisms as
reflecting anti-police attitudes. If police union officials have any private reservations, they feel constrained by their role to remain publicly silent, at the very least, and often describe criminal punishment of
officers who kill as being politically motivated efforts to scapegoat individual officers for systemic problems.9 In their view, what appears to
outsiders to be egregious police violence is in fact a justifiable reaction
to dangerous suspects, bad management, and difficult working conditions, and the union’s role is to protect hard-working officers from a
witch hunt so that officers can protect the public.
In-depth investigations of police departments in the wake of
highly publicized incidents of police violence since 2012 provide support for the views of both police union critics and police union leaders.
For instance, in January 2017, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued a scathing report (“DOJ Chicago Report”) finding, among other
things, that the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) engaged in a
pattern and practice of unreasonable uses of force, and that “there is
no meaningful, systemic accountability for officers who use force in
violation of the law or CPD policy.”10 In part, these accountability
failures are due to collective bargaining agreements between the city
and the unions that contain provisions impeding the investigation of
alleged police misconduct.11 However, the DOJ concluded that the
CPD bears some responsibility for these accountability failures.
Among other things, the DOJ Chicago Report states that the contracts allow CPD to override some of the problematic contract provisions, but management rarely does so.12

9 See Henrick Karoliszyn, Solidarity in Blue, CRIME REP. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://
thecrimereport.org/2016/02/22/solidarity-in-blue/; see also Jacob Fischler, Police Union Expresses
Frustration Over Labor’s Response to Ferguson, Eric Garner, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 10, 2014,
10:50 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/jacobfischler/police-union-expresses-frustration-over-la
bors-response-to-f?utm_term=.np51r4WXq#.ilQlq3d0x.

CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE N. DIST. OF ILL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSINVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 7 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/file/925846/download [hereinafter DOJ CHI. REP.].
10

TICE,

11

Id. at 47.

12

Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841837

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-3\GWN302.txt

716

unknown

Seq: 5

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

13-JUL-17

13:34

[Vol. 85:712

The August 2016 report of the DOJ, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department (“DOJ Baltimore Report”), faults both
the rank-and-file and supervisors for the pattern of unconstitutional
stops, searches, arrests, and excessive force, the “severe and unjustified” racial disparities harming African Americans, and retaliation
against civilians and police officers who speak out about abuses.13 The
DOJ Baltimore Report criticizes certain statutory and contractual job
protections, which police unions fought hard to attain and vigorously
defend, but it also describes shocking incidents of managerial neglect
and retaliation of the sort that prompt employees to join and defend
unions in the first place.14 Although the DOJ Baltimore Report takes
no position on that city’s police union, as we explain below in Section
II.B.1, past DOJ civil rights interventions and consent decrees have
encountered unions as obstacles to implementation of reform. Many
proposed reforms entail creating mechanisms of institutionalized cooperation between rank-and-file and management that unions may be
uniquely capable of delivering. As we argue below in Section III.B,
such reforms will not succeed if they fail to consider why unions have
not previously advocated such mechanisms or why they might resist
them.
The debates over police unions are part of a larger legal and policy debate over whether public employee unions are agents of or obstacles to government reform, particularly because local government
employees (including police) are among the most densely unionized in
the country.15 A standard criticism of government employee unions is
that they exercise disproportionate influence in setting government
policy.16 Until the passing of Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court appeared to be on the path to reduce union power,17 and the Court with
13 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2016), http://civilrights.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/20160810_
DOJ%20BPD%20Report-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter DOJ BALT. REP.].
14 See id. at 146, 152–53. Similarly, the DOJ Chicago Report notes that some of the actions
of CPD management, such as failing to provide information about the criteria for promotions
and failing to provide officers with safe and functional equipment, lower officer morale and
foster officer skepticism. See DOJ CHI. REP., supra note 10, at 123, 129.
15 In 2015, forty-five percent of local government employees were represented by a union,
as compared to less than eight percent of private sector employees. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-16-0158, UNION MEMBERS—2015 tbl.3 (2016), https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01282016.pdf.
16 See DANIEL DISALVO, GOVERNMENT AGAINST ITSELF: PUBLIC UNION POWER AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 4–5 (2015).
17 Five Justices expressed concern during a January 2016 oral argument about the constitutionality of a union security provision in a teachers’ union contract, in part because of the influence that teachers’ unions exert in setting education policy. See Transcript of Oral Argument at
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Justice Gorsuch is expected to continue down that path.18 Moreover,
legislatures in many states have eliminated the ability of some government employees to bargain collectively and narrowed the permissible
subjects of bargaining for those employees who retain union rights at
all, and these reductions in the power of public employee unions are
often described as being necessary to reduce the cost and improve the
quality of government service.19 Concern about the influence of public
employee unions is not confined to the political right, as activists and
scholars have focused criticism on union contractual provisions protecting officers investigated for excessive use of force.20
Perhaps no issue has been more controversial in the discussion of
police union responses to allegations of excessive force than statutory
and contractual protections for officers accused of misconduct, as crit4, 15, 41–42, 45–47, 76, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915).
After Justice Scalia died, an equally divided Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the suit
and, therefore, the law remains unchanged. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083
(2016) (per curiam); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227–32 (1977) (affirming that public unions may participate in policymaking).
18 Josh Gerstein, What Trump’s Supreme Court Pick Means for the Court, POLITICO (Feb.
1, 2017, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-supreme-court-gorsuch-234471
(“Perhaps the most certain result of putting Gorsuch on the court is an eventual setback for
public employee unions.”).
19 See MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS
7–20 (3d ed. 2016) (summarizing changes to public sector labor law and gathering sources evaluating need for changes).
20 See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1239 (2017) (arguing that state labor law poses a significant barrier to police reform and proposing that the
public be given a right to participate in collective bargaining over police disciplinary procedures); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799–801 (2012)
(arguing that “[c]ollective bargaining rights deter department-wide changes intended to prevent
constitutional violations” and proposing that scholars attend not only to constitutional law and
civil rights laws regulating policing but also to labor and employment law); Samuel Walker, The
Baltimore Police Union Contract and the Law Enforcement Officers’s Bill of Rights: Impediments to Accountability (May 2015) (unpublished report), http://www.aclu-md.org/
uploaded_files/0000/0681/walker_-_baltimore_police_union_contract_report.pdf (arguing that
collective bargaining agreements and law enforcement officers’ bills of rights (“LEOBORs”) are
impediments to police accountability); Black Lives Matter Publishes ‘Campaign Zero’ Plan to
Reduce Police Violence, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Aug. 26, 2015, 5:42 PM), http://
www.npr.org/2015/08/26/434975505/black-lives-matter-publishes-campaign-zero-plan-to-reducepolice-violence; see also Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706 (2015)
(discussing the law regulating policing, but not delving into labor law); Kevin M. Keenan &
Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185 (2005). But see Kate Levine, Police
Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1234–35 (2016) (urging that critics are mistaken to advocate
eliminating procedural protections for officers suspected of wrongdoing and instead that the
investigative protections available to officers should be extended to all criminal suspects). Part
III of this Article discusses the points of agreement and disagreement with these scholars.
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ics have assailed such protections and police unions defend them.21
Police in most states enjoy significantly more procedural and substantive protections against discipline for on-the-job and off-the-job misconduct than do private sector employees. As government employees,
police have constitutional due process rights if, as a matter of state or
local law or practice, they have an expectation of continued employment sufficient to create a property interest in the job.22 They have
constitutional immunity from use, in a criminal prosecution, of a statement made during an internal administrative investigation when the
officer was compelled to speak, under penalty of job discipline.23 They
also have a limited First Amendment right to be free from retaliation
for political activity off the job, unless the municipality has adopted a
valid, nondiscriminatory law prohibiting partisan political activity.24 In
at least sixteen states, police additionally have statutory rights to certain procedures in the investigation of misconduct under Law Enforcement Officers Bills of Rights (“LEOBORs”) as well as civil
service protections in many other states.25 Supplementing these constitutional and statutory protections are police union contracts, which

See Keenan & Walker, supra note 20, at 243 (advocating reduction of LEOBOR protections); Levine, supra note 20, at 1235 (advocating extending LEOBOR protections to all suspects); Jonah Newman, Can Chicago Take on Police Union Contracts This Year?, CHI. REP. (Jan.
9, 2017), http://chicagoreporter.com/can-chicago-take-on-police-union-contracts-this-year/.
21

22 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1985) (public employee
with property interest in employment who faces disciplinary discharge is entitled to pre-termination and post-termination procedural protections); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343–44 (1976)
(observing, in case involving discipline of police officer, that “[a] property interest in employment can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract”); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 602–03 (1972) (junior college professor had a right to claim a property interest in
continued employment even in absence of a tenure system because the faculty guide created an
expectation of tenure).
23 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); see also Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1312
(2001) (noting that many courts find such statements to be “the equivalent of formally immunized testimony” under Garrity).
24 See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1417–19 (2016); cf. U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973) (reaffirming the constitutionality of laws limiting certain political activities of federal employees).
25 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1101 to 38-1104 (2015); CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 3301–3311 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9200–9209 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 112.532
(2016); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725/3 (West 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.520 (West 2010);
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. § 626.89 (2014); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 289.060 (LexisNexis 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-14-4 (2013); 42 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-28.6-2 (2007); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 143.051, 143.123 (West 2008); VA.
CODE ANN. § 9.1-501 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-14A-2 (LexisNexis 2012).
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contain additional procedural and substantive protections against
discipline.26
The public controversy gives new urgency to consideration of the
role of police unions in promoting or thwarting police reform.27 Scholars of policing have debated police professionalization and community
policing, and have discussed the relationship between policing and democracy, but have, as police scholar Samuel Walker put it, “seriously
neglected” police unions.28 The substantial social science literature on
policing and police unions has rarely engaged with public sector labor
law, other than to note that collective bargaining rights are positively
correlated with increased compensation and job protections.29 Although labor law provides important opportunities for and constraints
on organizational change in police departments,30 police unions and
police union contractual protections have been neglected in labor law
scholarship.31 A particular concern of labor law has been whether and
how unionization can improve the quality of work for the benefit of
See infra Section I.C.2.
See Rushin, supra note 20, at 1198; Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of
Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205–17 (2014). Law professor David Sklansky and criminologist Samuel Walker have published their works on police unions in policing journals, but few
other scholars’ works on police unions have appeared in law reviews. See, e.g., Monique Marks
& David Sklansky, Introduction: The Role of the Ranks and File and Police Unions in Police
Reform, 18 POLICING AND SOC’Y 1 (2008), reprinted in POLICE REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP 1
(Monique Marks & David Sklanksy eds., 2012) (a reproduction of special issues of two journals:
POLICE PRAC. & RES., May 2008, and 18 POLICING AND SOC’Y, no. 1, 2008); Samuel Walker, The
Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important Areas of American Policing,
POLICE PRAC. & RES., May 2008, at 95, reprinted in POLICE REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP,
supra, at 88; cf. Harmon, supra note 20 (published in the Michigan Law Review).
28 Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important
Areas of American Policing, POLICE PRAC. & RES., May 2008, at 95, 95 (noting that although
police chiefs and civil rights activists “frequently allege that the police union prevents the fair
and thorough investigation of officer misconduct and the proper discipline of officers who have
in fact engaged in improper activity[,] [s]ocial scientists should not take these allegations at face
value, since they are made by persons with a direct interest in the issues involved”). As noted
above, see supra note 20, very recently legal scholars have begun to examine certain aspects of
police labor and employment relations, but this Article is the only law review piece that systematically studies the role of police unions as institutions.
29 See, e.g., Brigham R. Frandsen, The Effects of Collective Bargaining Rights on Public
Employee Compensation: Evidence from Teachers, Firefighters, and Police, 69 ILR REV. 84, 85
(2016).
30 As Stephen Rushin says in his analysis of police union contracts, legal scholars have
only recently discussed the impact of labor and employment law on police behavior. Rushin,
supra note 20, at 1198.
31 Until Rushin, supra note 20, the only content analysis of police union contracts was a
1992 content analysis of 328 contracts. David L. Carter & Allen D. Sapp, A Comparative Analysis of Clauses in Police Collective Bargaining Agreements as Indicators of Change in Labor Relations, 12 AM. J. POLICE, no. 2, 1993, at 17, 19.
26
27
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consumers of goods and services while simultaneously protecting the
dignity and standard of living of workers.32 But more work remains to
be done in thinking about police unions and public sector labor law as
offering leverage or resistance to change. In short, although there is a
general scholarly consensus that police unions play an important role
in policing and politics, there is no agreement concerning their proper
role, and there has been almost no sustained analysis of the role they
might play in police reform.33 The scholarly deficit has substantial
public policy consequences, as groups ranging from Black Lives Matter to the U.S. DOJ are proposing legal changes that will require the
cooperation of police labor organizations to implement notwithstanding a long history of police rank-and-file resistance to imposition of
reforms without their input.34
In public policy debates and in the nascent legal scholarship on
policing in the wake of the recent spate of police violence that
spawned the Black Lives Matter movement, many have advocated restricting the job protections for police officers in order to facilitate the
detection and punishment of criminal police violence. Reform is essential. But reform will not be accomplished simply by eliminating job
protections, even if that were politically feasible. Without support
from unions and some police rank-and-file, the kinds of reforms that
are now being proposed—e.g., public involvement in union-management negotiation of disciplinary procedures35—are unlikely to be enacted or implemented. Rather, police need to be involved in
improving police practices, and that involvement requires the cooperation of some kind of police labor representative.
This Article explains how public sector labor law might be
changed to enable activists outside of police departments to find allies
within police departments to support reforms. It does not propose
specific policy reforms about policing. Rather, it proposes structural
reform to police union representation and the duty to meet and confer
in order to enable policy reforms to be adopted and, importantly, implemented. In particular, this Article proposes that state public sector
Frandsen, supra note 29, at 84–85.
George L. Kelling & Robert B. Kliesmet, Police Unions, Police Culture, and Police
Abuse of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE 191, 192 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
34 See, e.g., A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, & Justice, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Comm
ControlofLawEnforcement-OnePager.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2017); PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE
ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
35 See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 20, at 1199.
32
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labor law be amended to require police departments to meet and confer with labor representatives other than the certified police union.
This modified form of minority union bargaining would, ideally, enable the minority of officers in a department who favor reform to discuss police practices even if the majority union prefers not to, or is
legally prohibited from, negotiating over those practices. The minority
union could be any organization the officers choose to represent them.
It might be an existing police officers’ affinity group (e.g., the local or
national Black, Latino, women’s or other officers’ association), or a
Black Lives Matter chapter, or any other group whom a significant
number of officers in a department select. The scope of the duty to
confer would encompass topics that are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining under most state’s labor law, including use of force, policing techniques, and community relations. The minority union would
have no authority to modify the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by the majority union. The point of minority
union bargaining would be to give the rank-and-file a voice in policing
policy without undermining the economic and other terms that management negotiated with the majority union.36 A limited form of minority union bargaining—a reform that has been advocated in other
contexts by both the political left and the political right at various
points in recent history—would create an institutional structure enabling diverse representatives of police rank-and-file to meet and confer with police management over policing practices. Although it might
weaken the power of the majority union, as any form of minority- or
dual-unionism necessarily does, it would facilitate rank-and-file support of the kinds of transparency, accountability, and constitutional
policing practices that police reformers have been advocating for at
least a generation.
Part I explores the structure and functioning of police departments and the evolution of police unions as a response to a hierarchical and autocratic command structure. Part II examines how and why
police unions have been obstacles to reform, focusing on union defense of protections for officers accused of misconduct. Part III describes and analyzes fifty years’ worth of instances in which cities have
implemented reforms to reduce police violence and improve policecommunity relations. All of the proposed reforms involved the cooperation of the rank-and-file, and many involved active cooperation
with the union. Part IV proposes relatively straightforward changes in
36

The specifics of the proposal are laid out in Part IV.
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the law governing police labor relations to implement the proposed
form of minority-unionism.
I. POLICE DEPARTMENTS

AND

POLICE UNIONS

A. The Structure of Police Departments and Police Labor Relations
Across the nation, there are approximately 18,000 police agencies
which together employ more than 1.1 million people, 750,000 of whom
are sworn officers.37 Although many small or rural departments do not
have unions, most large urban police departments are unionized.38
The total number of unionized officers is unknown and unions differ
in their structure, priorities, and degree of activity.39
Police departments are hierarchical, with a chain of command as
in the military40 and a sharp division between the leadership and the
rank-and-file.41 The top command, consisting of the police commissioner and the various chiefs,42 is responsible for official policymaking
within the organization.43 Typically, they have very little personal contact with the rank-and-file,44 perhaps in part due to the long-dominant
belief among police management scholars that police departments are
Karoliszyn, supra note 9.
See id. For a description of the wide variety of policing organizations that exist, see
PETER K. MANNING, POLICING CONTINGENCIES 43–45 (2003).
39 Karoliszyn, supra note 9; see also Colleen Kadleck, Police Employee Organizations, 26
POLICING 341, 345 (2003) (using a national sample of police employee organizations, explores
the variety in their structure, membership and perspectives on labor relations).
40 David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1209 (2006); see also
EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 25 (1990); Marks & Sklansky, supra note 27, at 1, 3.
This structure is a historical accident having do with the origins of the modern police in England.
See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW 116–17 (1993).
41 See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 40, at 117–18; Peter K. Manning, A Dialectic of Organisational and Occupational Culture, in POLICE OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE 47, 47 (Megan
O’Neill et al. eds., 2007). This command structure is the result of one of the three different eras
of police reform. See George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, in
COMMUNITY POLICING 96, 97–114 (Willard M. Olivier ed., 2000). In Seattle, for example, the
chain of command is as follows: Chief of Police, Deputy Chief, Assistant Chief, Captain, Lieutenant, Sergeant, then officers and detectives. Department Fact Sheet, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T,
http://www.seattle.gov/police/about-us/about-the-department/department-fact-sheet (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017).
42 See Manning, supra note 41, at 70 (“[The top command] is composed of officers above
the rank of superintendent (or commander) including chief, and deputy chief or assistant
chief.”). Detectives are typically considered a separate group from patrol officers and have a
higher status. See id. at 64; see also Wesley Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, in POLICE REFORM FROM
THE BOTTOM UP, supra note 27, at 144, 148.
43 See Manning, supra note 41, at 70.
44 See id. at 64.
37
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best organized with “strong, top-down management.”45 Middle management consists of captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and other
equivalent positions.46 Sergeants make up the lowest level of management and serve as the direct supervisors of the rank-and-file.47 Given
their placement in the management structure, sergeants often are aligned more closely with the rank-and-file than with top command.48
The bulk of the department consists of the rank-and-file, who sit at
the bottom of the organizational pyramid.49 At any given time, over
sixty percent of officers within a department are in the patrol division.50 Most will remain at this rank for their entire careers.51 This
hierarchy has important implications for unions, we argue, because
officers turn to unions to protect their interests since they otherwise
have little voice in the operation of the department.
Under the prevailing quasi-military style of police department organization, management seeks to maintain a high level of internal discipline and strict rank-and-file obedience to rules and policies.52 The
prevailing belief is that the rank-and-file must be strictly controlled
and monitored in order to ensure compliance.53 Police managers
“worry about laziness, corruption, racial profiling, and excessive force,
and they do not trust rank-and-file officers on any of those dimensions.”54 “In the face of continued scandals and charges of inequity,
Marks & Sklansky, supra note 27, at 1.
See Manning, supra note 41, at 69 (observing that middle management consists of the
“sergeant, lieutenant, inspector, chief inspector and superintendent or their equivalents” who
are “[s]ymbolically located between command and other officers”).
47 See Skogan, supra note 42, at 146.
48 See Manning, supra note 41, at 63, 67. In fact, sometimes sergeants are considered part
of the rank-and-file. See David H. Bayley, Police Reform: Who Done It?, in POLICE REFORM
FROM THE BOTTOM UP, supra note 27, at 16, 23.
49 See Manning, supra note 41, at 63. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the rankand-file excludes detectives.
50 Id. at 63.
51 Id. at 54.
52 See BITTNER, supra note 40, at 137; MANNING, supra note 38, at 49; Eugene A. Paoline
III, Taking Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding of Police Culture, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 199, 203
(2003) (“Uniformity in appearance, attitude, and behavior, as well as strict adherence to rules
and procedures, is expected of all recruits.”); David N. Allen, Police Supervision on the Street:
An Analysis of Supervisor/Officer Interaction During the Shift, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. 91, 92 (1982)
(noting the strict and unquestioning obedience required of the rank-and-file).
53 Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s
Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 565 (2001); Wesley
G. Skogan & Tracey L. Meares, Lawful Policing, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66,
67 (2004) (“The organization under which officers work struggles to keep control of its field
force.”).
54 Skogan, supra note 42, at 145; see also George L. Kelling et al., Police Accountability
and Community Policing, in COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 41, at 269, 269–70 (“Police chiefs
45
46
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police administrators tend to maintain an almost phobic preoccupation with accountability and conformity.”55
Although management focuses intensely on control and conformity with policy, police work inevitably requires the exercise of discretion.56 The judgment and discretion that most police officers and
management would agree is essential to good policing means that precise rules cannot always be followed, general rules do not provide
meaningful guidance,57 and policies are therefore not consistently enforced. Flexibility opens the door to arbitrariness and discrimination.
This is one reason why the relationship between line officers and management has been described as one “dominated by a feeling of uncertainty.”58 Rank-and-file officers fear punitive enforcement of policy
and often perceive management as being “not on the level,”59 using
rules primarily to blame them when things go wrong.60
Rank-and-file officers in many departments do not trust management to mete out discipline fairly. In Los Angeles, for example, in
2001, the Police Protective League, the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) officers’ union, requested that law professor Erwin
Chemerinsky and a group of civil rights lawyers investigate a major
scandal in the Rampart Division.61 The League did not trust the
LAPD to conduct a fair and thorough investigation and feared the
union and some officers might be scapegoated for a corruption scandal that they thought was a symptom of a larger problem. Professor
continually worry about abuse of authority . . . . As a consequence, it is not surprising that police
leaders have developed organizational mechanisms of control that seek to ensure police accountability to both the law and the policies and procedures of police departments.”); Hans Toch,
Police Officers as Change Agents in Police Reform, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 60, 63 (2008) (noting
that management wonders: “Can we really trust those bums to be honest and law-abiding . . . and
dedicated?”).
55 Todd Wuestewald & Brigitte Steinheider, Shared Leadership: Can Empowerment Work
in Police Organizations?, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 2006, at 48, 49, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org
/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print_display&article_id=789&issue_id=12006. Of course,
there are important exceptions. See, e.g., DOJ CHI. REP., supra note 10, at 105 (noting deficiencies in supervisors providing accountability).
56 Wuestewald & Steinheider, supra note 55, at 51.
57 SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 40, at 120–21.
58 Paoline, supra note 52, at 201.
59 SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 40, at 121.
60 Id. at 120–21. Sociologist Egon Bittner terms this the “legality” problem. See BITTNER,
supra note 40, at 350–52; see also MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET 9 (1981) (noting
that patrol officers “must cope not only with the terror of an often hostile and unpredictable
citizenry, but also with a hostile—even tyrannical—and unpredictable bureaucracy”); Malcolm
K. Sparrow, Implementing Community Policing, in COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 41, at 172,
177.
61 Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 547–49.
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Chemerinsky’s analysis of the LAPD’s report on the Rampart Division found that “virtually everyone, except the Chief of Police and the
Board of Inquiry, is dissatisfied with the current disciplinary system.”62 Concerns included perceptions that the chief controlled the
system and used it to protect command staff and persecute
whistleblowers and minority officers.63 Nearly fifteen years later, similar perceptions persist. In 2014, an overwhelming number of LAPD
rank-and-file officers still believed that management’s disciplinary decisions “revolved around an officer’s rank and whether he or she was
well liked by their superiors in the department. [Officers believed that
c]ommand-level officers routinely received slaps on the wrist or no
punishment, while lower-ranking officers were suspended for similar
misconduct . . . .”64 Similarly, in 2016, the DOJ found that the Baltimore Police Department failed to apply discipline consistently:
“Throughout our interviews and ride-alongs with officers, we heard
officers express that discipline is only imposed if an incident makes it
into the press or if you were on the wrong side of a supervisor, not
because of the magnitude of the misconduct.”65
Empirical studies of police stress find that the indignities of poor
employment practices—“arbitrary decision making, poor working
conditions,” feeling lack of support from supervisors—cause more
stress to officers than “witnessing injuries, deaths or other potentially
traumatic events” involving police work.66 Recent commentary on police legitimacy noted this and, giving the example of New York police
officers who were disciplined and publicly reprimanded for playing
football with youngsters at a Fourth of July celebration at a low-income housing project, observed that police officers “react to arbitrary
power in the same way that citizens do when they are policed: with
62

Id. at 598.

63

Id.

Joel Rubin & Jack Leonard, LAPD Survey in Wake of Dorner Rampage Finds Bias
Complaints, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014, 11:16 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/lame-lapd-dorner-20141114-story.html; see also Robin Abcarian, She’s the Mom of Four Black
Men, a Former L.A. Cop and a Major Skeptic of ‘Justifiable’ Police Shootings, L.A. TIMES (July
18, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-abcarian-cheryl-dorsey-2016
0718-snap-story.html (“The Dorner tragedy, by the way, also occasioned a spasm of self-reflection in the LAPD. Chief Charlie Beck surveyed his troops and discovered a widespread perception that the LAPD dispensed discipline unfairly, based on skin color, rank and nepotism.”).
64

65

DOJ BALT. REP., supra note 13, at 147.

Jeffrey Fagan et al, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York, in COMPARING THE
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF POLICE INTELLIGENCE 203, 219 (Thierry Delpeuch & Jacqueline
E. Ross eds., 2016) (citing Akiva M. Liberman et al., Routine Occupational Stress and Psychological Distress in Police, 25 POLICING 421, 423, 432 (2002)).
66
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ambivalence about the institution, and resistance or hostility toward
the rules of that institution.”67 As one policing scholar observed,
Officers come to find out that when they are recognized it is
usually for something that they have done wrong (procedurally), rather than for something they have done well (substantively). . . . [O]fficers are constrained, working within an
organization that demands that all problems be handled on
the street with efficiency and certainty, yet held to excessive
scrutiny by “watchful administrators” at a later date.68
In sum, police scholars note that rank-and-file officers often perceive their departments “as a mock bureaucracy, capricious, unpredictable and punitive, rather than democratic and fair.”69 Although
the reality is that both management and the rank-and-file understand
that rules cannot guide their behavior in all instances, any violation,
no matter how small, can still result in punishment.70 Thus, the rankand-file views management’s fixation on rule-following in the face of
these contradictions as illegitimate.71 The result is that management
officers “are perceived as mere disciplinarians” and “are often viewed
by the line personnel with distrust and even contempt.”72 In light of
this focus on control and discipline of rank-and-file officers for conduct like playing football with kids that seems desirable or at least
benign, police unions often focus their bargaining and contract enforcement efforts toward protecting officers from discipline and arbi67 Id.; see also Christopher Robbins, NYPD: Dry-Humping Is OK, but Throwing Football
Is Misconduct, GOTHAMIST (Sept. 19, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://gothamist.com/2011/09/19/nypd_dryhumping_ok_throwing_footba.php.
68 Paoline, supra note 52, at 201 (quoting BROWN, supra note 60, at 80); see also Skogan &
Meares, supra note 53, at 79 (“Traditionally, police management consists of overseeing subordinates until they break a rule in the book and then punishing them. It is essentially negative, with
little in their management kitbag but sanctions for noncompliance; hence, the emphasis on internal inspections to ensure compliance with rules.”).
69 Manning, supra note 41, at 73; see Paoline, supra note 52, at 204 (“[O]fficers must also
provide protection to one another against supervisors, in the organizational environment, who
are often viewed as ‘out to make their jobs difficult.’ ”); Kelling et al., supra note 54, at 277
(noting that officers see discipline as “arbitrary and unjust”).
70 See Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 565–66; see also DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR
THE FUTURE 64 (1994) (“Because police officers are almost always at risk of violating some
stricture, management is perceived by police officers as oppressive and quixotic.”); Sparrow,
supra note 60, at 177.
71 SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 40, at 122 (“Esprit among police is desirable and necessary, but when coupled with the necessity of routine violations of the rules in order to get the job
done, it delegitimizes everything the brass does.”).
72 BITTNER, supra note 40, at 143–44; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 565 (relating
being “stunned by the extent of hostility to the Chief of Police and the command staff” within
the LAPD).
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trary work assignments, fighting for compensation, and ensuring
compliance with seniority rules, among other labor interests.73
Although these negative perceptions of management’s motives
could be tempered by contact, rank-and-file officers have few opportunities to interact with top command outside of the context of punishment.74 They have little direct communication with top-level
management because the information flow is “almost exclusively
downwards through the chain of command,” and not the opposite.75
This isolation from top command increases the risk of miscommunication, misunderstandings, and resentment, and it also leads police unions to adopt a highly defensive approach to union-management
relations.76
The rank-and-file’s shared perception that management’s exercises of power are illegitimate, coupled with their isolation from top
command, facilitates the creation of a subculture amongst the rankand-file with its own political life that remains largely hidden from
management.77 Amongst the rank-and-file, there is a “rare degree of
camaraderie and group loyalty”78 that is partly the result of having to
confront “unpredictable and punitive supervisory oversight.”79 In
short, scholars agree that management and the rank-and-file have
73

See infra Section I.C.

See Manning, supra note 41, at 68. “Very little direct exchange unites [top command]
and officers and this relationship shows the greatest social distance, ambivalence, and animosity.” Id. And, when things go wrong, such as a fatal shooting, top management “in general acts
first and asks questions later.” Id.

R

75 See BITTNER, supra note 40, at 152; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 40, at 121 (“This
sense of isolation is exacerbated by the difficulty of communicating up and down the rigid chains
of command that characterize the military-style hierarchy.”).

R

76 See MANNING, supra note 38, at 246 (“The segments of the culture, a response to hierarchy, isolation, and information based at the bottom, communicate more within than across, creating constant misunderstandings and a sense of arbitrary discipline.”); Chemerinsky, supra note
53, at 565 (noting the alienation between the rank-and-file and top command within the LAPD).

R

74

R

See BROWN, supra note 60, at 94 (“[H]ierarchical controls . . . increase group solidarity
and loyalty among patrolmen and the dependence of a patrolman upon his immediate peer
group, while exacerbating the ongoing conflict between patrolmen and administrators.”); see
also Paoline, supra note 52, at 200 (“Viewing police culture as an occupational phenomena suggests that officers collectively confront situations that arise in the environments of policing, and
subsequent attitudes, values, and norms that result are in response to those environments.”); cf.
JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE 199 (1990) (discussing creation of
forest poaching subculture in face of property rights of others viewed as illegitimate).

R

78 SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 40, at 122; see also Toch, supra note 54, at 61 (“A code of
conduct can evolve in the locker room that appears to tolerate transgressions and discourages
‘snitching’ on peers.”).

R

77

79

Paoline, supra note 52, at 201 (emphasis removed).
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their own distinct cultures80 and that the relationship between them is
often characterized by “mutual suspicion and mistrust.”81
As will be explored below in Section I.C, police officers responded to this kind of hierarchical and punitive supervisory structure
by forming unions. And many police officers are quite dedicated
unionists precisely because they see the union as necessary to protect
their interests in fair process and in having a voice in the workplace.
B. From Professionalism to Community Policing
The contemporary emphasis on hierarchy and adherence to rules
was the product of mid-twentieth-century reforms that attempted to
combat police corruption by professionalizing police work. In the late
nineteenth century, police were closely tied to their communities,
were under the control of local political machines, engaged in foot
patrols, and often lived in the communities they policed.82 The close
connection to the community and its political machinery was believed
to lead to police corruption.83 To sever police hiring, promotion, and
control from the local political machine, early twentieth-century local
government reformers sought to “professionalize” the police.84 Professionalism did not refer to giving individual rank-and-file officers more
autonomy and discretion.85 Rather, it referred to reducing political influence over police and improving police efficiency.86
A crucial aspect of the professionalism project was to define the
core mission of the police as crime control, thereby insulating officers
from political influence and corruption by distancing them from the
community.87 Once the official function of the police was crime con80 See David Alan Sklansky, Seeing Blue: Police Reform, Occupational Culture, and Cognitive Burn-In, in POLICE OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 41, at 19, 38 (“An influential study
in the early 1980s argued that ‘management cops’ have their own culture, separate and distinct
from ‘street cop culture.’ ”); Toch, supra note 54, at 63. See generally BAYLEY, supra note 70, at
66; ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND MANAGEMENT
COPS (1983).
81 Toch, supra note 54, at 63; see also Sklansky, supra note 80, at 25; Chemerinsky, supra
note 53, at 565.
82 Kelling & Moore, supra note 41, at 98–99.
83 See id. at 100–01.
84 Id. at 102, 108.
85 Id. at 108.
86 Id. at 103.
87 Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 193; Samuel Walker, “Broken Windows” and
Fractured History: The Use and Misuse of History in Recent Police Patrol Analysis, in COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 41, at 326, 328 (“The most professionalized departments, in fact, took
extra measures to de-personalize policing. Frequent rotation of beat assignments was adopted as
a strategy to combat corruption.”).
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trol, departments “move[d] away from crime prevention (except as an
outcome of arrest), peacekeeping, order maintenance, and the provision of social and emergency services.”88 This, along with the isolation
of officers from citizens that was thought necessary to combat corruption, contributed to what various scholars characterize as “officer
alienation from the citizens they serve,” officers’ self-conception as
“crime fighters and the ‘thin blue line,’” and “a warrior mentality.”89
An important goal of the professionalism era was to control rankand-file officers, leading to extensive and strict rules to govern their
conduct, increased surveillance and oversight of officers, and reduced
rank-and-file officer discretion.90 The control of the rank-and-file did
not end with their work related duties. Police management also attempted to control the personal lives of officers in order to reduce the
opportunities for corruption.91 Officers were prohibited “from living
in the areas they policed, from incurring debts, or from being involved
in businesses in their areas, as well as requir[ed] . . . to declare the
business interests of their families.”92 Some departments went even
further to “de-personalize policing” by frequently reassigning patrol
officers to new neighborhoods far removed from the neighborhoods
where officers lived.93 These, and a host of other controls, helped spur
the creation of police unions.94
A new model of policing, known as community policing, emerged
in the late 1970s and early 1980s95 to put officers back into relationKelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 193; see also Sklansky, supra note 80, at 20, 23.
Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 203–04.
90 See id. at 193; see also SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA 14 (2d ed. 1992).
Police reformers viewed officers “as a tightly controlled and inherently limited functionary
whose primary, if not sole, role was nondiscretionary law enforcement.” Kelling & Kliesmet,
supra note 33, at 194 (citing George L. Kelling & James K. “Chips” Stewart, The Evolution of
Contemporary Policing, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICE MANAGEMENT 3 (William A. Geller
ed., 3d ed. 1991)). In part, this model of strict control of the rank-and-file was in line with the
Frederick Taylor model for routinizing factory work. Sklansky, supra note 80, at 31. The Taylorism model focuses on top-down control of workers through rigid rules. Wuestewald &
Steinheider, supra note 55, at 49 (“The scientific and bureaucratic management principles of
Frederick Taylor and Max Weber were in vogue and found welcome application in the drive to
professionalize law enforcement.”).
91 See Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 195 (citing MALCOLM K. SPARROW ET AL.,
BEYOND 911: A NEW ERA FOR POLICING 36–37 (1990)); see also Kelling & Moore, supra note
41, at 102 (noting concerns with “separat[ing] police from politics”).
92 Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 195 (citing SPARROW ET AL., supra note 91, at
36–37).
93 Walker, supra note 87, at 328.
94 Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 195–96.
95 See Scott Lewis et al., Acceptance of Community Policing Among Police Officers and
Police Administrators, 22 POLICING 567, 567–68 (1999); Kelling & Moore, supra note 41, at 109;
88
89
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ships with the community and to transform rank-and-file officers into
problem solvers.96 Community policing is a broad concept used to describe a wide variety of policing approaches.97 Two common themes
among them are that power is pushed to officers at the lower levels of
the organization and that there is increased involvement with the
community.98 Some versions of community policing embrace the idea
that the social work aspects of policing are important,99 and encourage
officers to attempt to determine the root causes of crime and to look
beyond the criminal justice system to solve them.100 Today, most departments claim that they are engaged in community policing.101 Yet,
police continue to follow professionalism-era practices for a variety of

see also Steve Herbert, ‘Hard Charger’ or ‘Station Queen’? Policing and the Masculinist State, 8
GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE 55, 62 (2001).
96 See Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225,
228 (2015). See generally MICHAEL J. PALMIOTTO, COMMUNITY POLICING: A POLICING STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000).
97

See generally PALMIOTTO, supra note 96.

Kelling & Moore, supra note 41, at 109–13; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING 9 (1994), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf (“In 1979, Herman Goldstein developed and advanced the
concept of ‘problem-oriented policing’ (POP), which encouraged police to begin thinking differently about their purpose. Goldstein suggested that problem resolution constituted the true, substantive work of policing and advocated that police identify and address root causes of problems
that lead to repeat calls for service. POP required a move from a reactive, incident-oriented
stance to one that actively addressed the problems that continually drained police resources.”)
(citing Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 236, 241–43 (1979)); Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 202–03.
98

See generally PALMIOTTO, supra note 96; SARA SATINSKY ET AL., HUMAN IMPACT PARTNERS, STRESS ON THE STREETS (SOS) 17 (2015), http://www.trustnottrauma.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/HIP_Stress-on-the-Streets_FullReport.pdf (“By the 1990s the concepts of community-oriented policing and problem-solving policing were merged into a form used widely
today that encourages officers to understand and analyze the roots of problems, then to solve
and evaluate them in ways that may include looking beyond the criminal justice system for
solutions.”).
99

100 L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 115, 143–44 (2014) (citing Herbert, supra note 95, at 63; and Kelling et al., supra note
54, at 270).
101 Wesley G. Skogan, The Promise of Community Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION 27, 27
(David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006) (“By 2000, a federal survey . . . found that
more than 90 percent of departments in cities over 250,000 in population reported having fulltime, trained community policing officers in the field.” (citation omitted)). However, community
policing involves a number of different practices, including patrolling on foot, or with bikes,
horses, or segways. Id. Some communities “train civilians in citizen police academies, open small
neighborhood storefront offices, conduct surveys to measure community satisfaction, canvass
door-to-door to identify local problems, publish newsletters, conduct drug education projects,
and work with municipal agencies to enforce health and safety regulations.” Id.
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reasons, including the growth in quantitative measures of job performance and the so-called “War on Drugs.”102
The set of legal and policy changes known as the War on Drugs
sought to eliminate drug sales and use through massive drug arrests
and other proactive policing strategies. As many scholars observed,
the War on Drugs fueled racial disparities in arrest rates and exacerbated negative relationships between the police and communities of
color.103 Both community policing and the proactive policing strategies
associated with drug enforcement policy required departments to
gather information in order to analyze problems, and technological
change enabled police departments to collect data and use data analysis in personnel management on an unprecedented scale.104 This had
significant consequences for how police departments managed line officers and how officers responded.105
Quantitative measures rapidly became one of the most significant
elements of contemporary evaluation of police officer job performance. The reliance on counting stops, arrests, and other measures of
law enforcement vigor originated in New York under the leadership of
William Bratton, a proponent of the “broken windows” theory of policing.106 The broken windows idea was “that the police could cut
down on serious crimes by making it clear that even the trivial ones
wouldn’t go unpunished.”107 To ensure that the rank-and-file implemented this philosophy, especially in neighborhoods inhabited by indigent people of color, the New York Police Department (“NYPD”)
102 See generally STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS,
Moore, supra note 41, at 97, 101–02.

AND

POWER 94–109 (2006); Kelling &
R

See generally Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV.
839 (2002); Dan Gardner, Civil Liberties Cast Aside in Overzealous Drug War, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2001, at 30A (recognizing police methods used to prevent drug crimes); Punishment and
Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 2000), http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa.
103

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, COMPSTAT: ITS ORIEVOLUTION, AND FUTURE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2–6 (2013), https://
www.bja.gov/publications/perf-compstat.pdf [hereinafter DOJ COMPSTAT REP.].
104

GINS,

105 See PALMIOTTO, supra note 96, at 174–95. See generally DOJ COMPSTAT REP., supra
note 104, at 3–8. More recently, predictive policing and other algorithms, Chicago heat lists, and
big data are the new policing technologies. “Yet, an increased reliance today on technology to
analyze and predict problems, in addition to outfitting police with weaponry that creates urban
‘warriors,’ can distance police from the communities they serve.” SATINSKY ET AL., supra note
99, at 17.

Saki Knafo, A Black Police Officer’s Fight Against the N.Y.P.D., N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/magazine/a-black-police-officers-fightagainst-the-nypd.html; see also DOJ COMPSTAT REP., supra note 104, at 3–6.
107 Knafo, supra note 106.
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R
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developed a management system that kept careful track of arrest and
crime statistics throughout the City. The system was called CompStat,
short for “compare statistics.”108 The sharp decline in the number of
murders in New York in the late 1990s coincided with the adoption of
CompStat, and so cities across the United States embraced it and
hired chiefs and consultants committed to implementing it, with the
result that “most large American cities [now] use some form of
CompStat.”109
Although some credited CompStat for falling murder and violent
crime rates, by the early 2000s, doubters began to question whether
broken windows policing and the CompStat measure of police work
was the cause and some voiced doubts about the effects it had on police behavior.110 Eli Silverman, a police-studies professor at John Jay
College of Criminal Justice, who had been an early supporter of
CompStat, had received a number of letters from NYPD officers saying that CompStat was not all that it seemed.111 Silverman and a fellow
criminologist and retired NYPD captain, John Eterno, set out to study
how the system worked.112
They surveyed more than 2,000 retired NYPD officers in 2008
and 2012 and found that CompStat had a substantial effect on police
work, but it was not uniformly positive.113 They learned that during
the CompStat era, officers “were twice as likely as their predecessors
to say that they had been under . . . pressure to increase arrests, and
three times as likely to say” they experienced pressure to issue more
summonses.114 “Most of this activity took place in minority neighborhoods. In predominantly black Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, for example, officers issued more than 2,000 summonses a year between
2008 and 2011 to people riding their bicycles on the sidewalk,” but “an
average of eight bike tickets a year in predominantly white and notably bike-friendly Park Slope.”115 The New York Civil Liberties Union
calculated that “between 2001 and 2013, black and Hispanic people
Id.
Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. (“In districtwide CompStat meetings, executives interrogated commanders about
their violent-crime statistics. Some commanders tried to protect themselves by underreporting or
reclassifying major crimes. Others tried to show they were being ‘proactive’; invariably this
meant more stops, more summonses, more arrests.”).
115 Id.
108
109
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were more than four times as likely as whites to receive summonses
for minor violations.”116
The emphasis on evaluating officers according to arrests, summonses, and stops and frisks had the perhaps unintended consequence
of dissuading officers from using innovative approaches to crime reduction, even when the innovations appeared to work. For example,
“instead of praising the officer who developed [a program that appeared to reduce shoplifting], . . . the chief told him to ‘get more numbers.’”117 As one officer complained, “You don’t get recognized and
rewarded for helping a homeless person get permanent housing, but
you get recognized for arresting them again and again and again.”118
The confluence of CompStat, broken windows policing, and the
War on Drugs not only created increasingly negative relationships between the police and communities of color, but it also negatively influenced the relationship between the rank-and-file and police
management. CompStat, with the pressure it put on management to
reduce the crime rate, led to management pressure on rank-and-file
officers to perform in ways that could be measured. Management exercised more control and scrutiny over the daily work behaviors of
rank-and-file officers. And, as discussed below, rank-and-file officers
who expressed dissatisfaction with these practices were threatened
with poor performance evaluations, given unpleasant work assignments, and subjected to involuntary transfers and other negative consequences to their daily work life. For all these reasons, rank-and-file
officers turned to their unions for protection.
C. Police Unions as a Response to Police Management and Police
Department Structure
Police officers today belong to a wide array of organizations to
represent their interests. Although in labor law a union is a membership organization that exists to represent employees for purposes of
collective bargaining over conditions of employment, this Article uses
the term “union” somewhat more loosely to capture the full range of
police labor organizations. Some police unions today are affiliated
with either the Teamsters or the AFL-CIO’s International Union of
Police Associations, and these typically have been certified or recognized as representing all police employees within a bargaining unit.119
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id.
Id.
DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY

AND THE

POLICE 181, 183 (2008).
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Other independent police unions developed from local benevolent associations, protective leagues, federations, lodges, or international police associations, and these are typically not affiliated with
the rest of organized labor in the United States and may or may not
be certified as the exclusive representative of the officers on whose
behalf they negotiate.120 Some officers also belong to identity-based
police organizations, which sometimes have close relationships to
their civilian counterparts, and these identity or affinity groups do not
have the legal right to bargain collectively on behalf of their members,
as a labor union does, but they may nevertheless play an informal role
in speaking for their members both within the department and publicly.121 Police unions and identity-based groups within police departments may jointly take positions on matters of department policy, but
sometimes they compete with each other for rank-and-file support
and solidarity.122
This section of the Article discusses the history of police unionization, the web of contractual and statutory terms governing police
working conditions, and the involvement of police unions in the political and policymaking process.
1. History of Police Unions
Police officers in many cities began joining unions in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when workers in every industry unionized, and for the same reasons—to improve pay and working
conditions and to gain some measure of control over their work
lives.123 Police in Boston in 1919, for example, worked regular shifts of
between seventy-three and ninety-eight hours a week, “were sometimes required to remain on duty seventeen hours” a day, had to buy
their own uniforms, and did not receive a raise between 1898 and
1913, even though the cost of living had doubled.124 Station houses
were unsanitary.125 Supervisors restricted where officers could go on
their scarce free time.126 Equally as important to police officers and
government reformers was the idea that unions might reduce endemic
Id. at 183.
Id. at 181.
122 Id.
123 See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 193–94, 198–99, 201 (1977); HERVEY A.
JURIS & PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM 15 (1973); MARGARET LEVI, BUREAUCRATIC INSURGENCY 27–56 (1977); JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS 17 (2004).
124 SLATER, supra note 123, at 24–25.
125 Id.
126 Id.
120
121
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corruption in local government.127 John Commons, the leading labor
economist of the early twentieth century, found that labor organizing
among municipal employees was the leading antidote to political machines and corruption because they aided reformers in local government to set wages, hours, and working conditions without regard to
the personal, economic, and political self-interest of city leaders.128
But business and anti-labor groups feared that unionized police
would strike and, more important, would not stop other employees
from striking and picketing. When Boston police formed a union and
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (“AFL”) in August
1919,129 the chief of police suspended seventeen union leaders (and
two policemen the chief mistakenly believed were union leaders). In
protest nearly three-quarters of the Boston police walked out the next
day.130 Violence and looting ensued.131 Governor Calvin Coolidge
called out troopers who, after firing into the crowd killing nine and
wounding twenty-three more, stopped the looting and prevented support for the striking police from turning into a citywide general
strike.132 The violence caused a panic about strikes by police or any
other government employees, which resulted in the collapse of all
AFL-affiliated police union locals and a huge backlash against government employee unions generally and police unions in particular.133 As
a result, the unionization of government employees that had begun in
the Progressive Era ground to a halt, only to really pick up steam in
the post–World War II period as government employees’ earnings
were outstripped by factory and skilled labor earnings and the growth
of private sector unionization eventually made it seem that government employee unions were both desirable and inevitable.134
See id. at 17.
Id. (quoting JOHN R. COMMONS, LABOR AND ADMINISTRATION 111–12 (Augustus M.
Kelley 1964) (1913)).
129 Id. at 25.
130 Id. at 26.
131 See id. at 13, 27.
132 Id. at 13–14.
133 See id. at 35–37; JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 123, at 16–17. In September 1919, the
Boston Police Commissioner banned the police union, and a strike resulted. Joanne Klein, History of Police Unions, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2207, 2211
(Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014). President Wilson called the strike a “crime
against civilization,” one that rang of a Bolshevik threat and Communist undertones. See id.
After rioting and looting, all 1,147 strikers were dismissed. SLATER, supra note 123, at 14. This
event stalled the momentum that had been building in other cities to establish police unions. See
id.
134 See JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 123, at 17–18; see also Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note
33, at 196.
127
128
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Police officers formed local unions in various cities in the 1940s,
and some police unions affiliated with national labor federations, including the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), founded in 1932, and some with the national
federations of police officers, including the Fraternal Order of Police
(“FOP”), founded in 1915.135 States began to enact laws permitting
government employee collective bargaining in the late 1950s. Wisconsin was the first in 1959.136 However, well into the 1960s, police departments routinely fired officers who attempted to unionize137 and courts
upheld the power of cities to ban officers from joining unions.138 In the
absence of any legal right to unionize or bargain collectively, government employee unions became adept at securing their members’ interests through political activity and negotiating informal agreements
with public officials.139
Unions finally succeeded in gaining a lasting foothold in American police departments in the late 1960s, as rank-and-file officers felt
attacked by the civil rights movement’s focus on police brutality and
racism and by federal court decisions limiting police officers’ investigatory and arrest powers.140 Officers also did not have protection
within the department when they were investigated or accused of misconduct and felt they had no way to present grievances to management.141 Furthermore, they feared that civilian review boards would
scapegoat individual rank-and-file officers for practices that management encouraged or even required.142 Then, as now, officers believed
135 See A History of the Fraternal Order of Police, FRATERNAL ORD. POLICE, https://
www.fop.net/CmsPage.aspx?id=13 [https://perma.cc/74DV-NT8L] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017);
AFSCME: 75 Years of History, AFSCME, http://www.afscme.org/union/history/afscme-75-yearsof-history [https://perma.cc/9C2R-RTME] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017); see also JURIS & FEUILLE,
supra note 123, at 17–18.
136

SLATER, supra note 123, at 9. See id. at 158–92, for a more complete discussion.

137 See FOGELSON, supra note 123, at 193–96; LEVI, supra note 123, at 122–23, 144; see also
Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 196. One of the authors, Kliesmet, “was harassed, arrested,
and eventually fired for his union activities while a member of the Milwaukee Police Department. (Both the arrest and firing were later overturned.)” Id.

R
R
R
R

138 E.g., Local 201, AFSCME v. City of Muskegon, 120 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Mich. 1963) (reasoning that a police officer cannot join a union because he is “required by law and invariably
becomes a neutralizer in controversies involving the right of public assemblage, neighborhood
disputes, domestic difficulties and strikes, between labor and management” and “his actions in
these instances must be governed by his oath of office”).
139

SLATER, supra note 123, at 96.

R

140

Keenan & Walker, supra note 20, at 196.

R

141

Id. at 196–97.

142

See id. at 196 (quoting JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 123, at 20–21).
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that discipline was meted out only to those who criticized
management.143
Not surprisingly, unions representing rank-and-file officers negotiated for contractual protections against discipline and lobbied legislators to incorporate these protections in legislation, including
LEOBORs.144 They sought to protect officer autonomy, effectiveness,
and safety by opposing constitutional criminal procedure restrictions
on police conduct and by blocking civilian oversight of police discipline.145 The legacy of the 1960s is collective bargaining agreements
and LEOBORs, which make it difficult to investigate and punish officers, and limited civilian oversight, all of which can impede reform
efforts.146
2. Elements of Police Union Contracts
Police union contracts contain provisions regarding wages, benefits, and discipline.147 Police officers, like all government employees,
have statutory and constitutional rights to fair treatment in personnel
decisions.148 However, police protection exceeds that provided to
workers in other industries. In addition to the rights enjoyed by all
government employees, police officers in at least sixteen states have
special statutory protections from LEOBORs.149 And even in states or
cities that have not enacted a LEOBOR, similar provisions are often
included in union contracts.150
143 Id. at 196–97 (citing JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 123, at 138). These punishments included punitive transfers. JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 123, at 138.
144 See Keenan & Walker, supra note 20, at 206–10 (describing protections of bills of
rights). See generally Levine, supra note 20 (describing LEOBOR protections against interrogation and other investigative techniques commonly used for other people suspected of wrongdoing and arguing that the protections should be extended to all criminal suspects rather than
eliminated for police).
145 See Keenan & Walker, supra note 20, at 186, 189, 190–91.
146 See infra Part II.
147 Adeshina Emmanuel, How Union Contracts Shield Police Departments from DOJ Reforms, IN THESE TIMES (June 21, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/features/police-killings-unioncontracts.html.
148 Nonprobationary government employees enjoy a constitutional due process right to notice and some form of hearing before being fired from a job. Cf. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1972) (holding that professor on probation was not denied due
process when university did not hold hearing and failed to rehire); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 599 (1972) (explaining Roth). However, if an employee does not have an expectation of
continued employment, he is not entitled to due process before termination of the job. Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345, 347 (1976) (holding that city police officer held his position at will and
was therefore not entitled to due process before termination).
149 See supra notes 25, 144 and accompanying text.
150 See Levine, supra note 20, at 1224–25, 1224 n.140.
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As a matter of labor law in most states, unions are selected and
govern on a majority rule principle. Under that principle, the union
chosen by the majority of employees in a job classification or department, what is generally known as a “bargaining unit,” is the exclusive
representative of all the employees in that unit.151 The purpose of majority rule and exclusive representation is to strengthen and legitimize
the employee representative by enabling it to speak with one voice
and to enable the employees, within their union, to agree on priorities
and resolve differences.152 Law limits the ability of the majority representative to sacrifice the interests of the minority by imposing a duty
of fair representation, which requires the union to represent all employees in the unit fairly and competently and prohibits the union and
its officers from engaging in arbitrary action or invidious discrimination against individuals or the minority.153
When police officers gained the right to unionize and bargain collectively in the 1960s, union leadership embraced the language of professionalism that police management and an earlier generation of
police reformers had used, insisting that the purpose of the police was
to control crime.154 However, police unions responded to the extensive
rules and regulations controlling rank-and-file behavior by negotiating
their own set of rules and regulations to protect rank-and-file officers
from arbitrary exercises of management power.155 Unions challenged
exercises of managerial prerogative through grievance arbitration, and
protected members’ economic interests and working conditions by advocating for favorable “wages and benefits; job security; hiring, retention, promotion, and disciplinary processes; [and] access to ‘good’
jobs, shifts, assignments, [and] overtime.”156 As one labor lawyer
opined, “It is nearly impossible to have a situation in which a creative
police organizer cannot find a rule, regulation, guideline, budget provision, benefit program rule, or personnel procedure which cannot be
exploited to significantly increase the rights and benefits of working
officers.”157 Professionalism era reforms, with its host of controls, not
151 See generally Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles and
Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 269–71 (1987) (explaining the principle of exclusive representation and questioning certain aspects of its viability).
152 See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
153 See Catherine L. Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, 4
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 857, 874 (2014).
154 See Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 198–99.
155 Id. at 197.
156 Id. at 198.
157 Id. at 197. Unions began to use various rules to exercise “countercontrol,” including
“the Constitution; federal statutes; state statutes and regulations; city ordinances; internal budget

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841837

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-3\GWN302.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 28

13-JUL-17

POLICE UNIONS

13:34

739

only helped spur the creation of police unions but also “were directly
responsible for the shape and functions of police unions as well.”158
Police collective bargaining agreements look in part like the labor
agreements negotiated by a wide range of public and private sector
unions. They contain provisions governing economic terms of employment, including wages, hours, sickness and vacation leave, pensions,
health insurance, death benefits, and so forth.159 There are typically
detailed provisions governing overtime compensation, payment when
called to testify, compensation for purchasing uniforms, and the right
to have protective equipment like bullet-proof vests.160 They prohibit
discrimination on the basis of union membership, race, religion, gender, and so on, and generally require just cause for discipline and discharge.161 They create a grievance process usually culminating in
arbitration.162 Given the history of rank-and-file concern about arbiand personnel regulations and directives; Equal Employment Opportunity rules and affirmative
action plans and court decrees; public disclosure, privacy, and administrative law rules; general
orders; squad or division rules, directives, and guidelines; and personnel records.” Id.
158 Id. at 193–97.
159 Cf., e.g., Salary and Benefits, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, http://mpdc.dc.gov/page/
salary-and-benefits (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). Contracts for dozens of police departments were
obtained by public records act requests and made available online. See Police Contracts
Database, CHECKTHEPOLICE.ORG http://www.checkthepolice.org/database/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2017). We downloaded from that site contracts from: Albuquerque, Anaheim, Anchorage, Aurora, Austin, Bakersfield, Baltimore, Baton Rouge, Berkeley, Beverly Hills, Boston, Buffalo,
Burbank, Carlsbad, Chandler, Chicago, Chico, Chula Vista, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus,
Corpus Christi, Costa Mesa, Cypress, Dallas, Daly City, Denver, Detroit, District of Columbia
Metro, Duluth, Durham, East Palo Alto, El Paso, Eureka, Fort Wayne, Fremont, Fresno, Glendale, Hayward, Henderson, Hialeah, Honolulu, Houston, Indianapolis, Irvine, Jacksonville,
Jersey City, Kansas City, Laredo, Las Vegas, Lexington, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Los Angeles
County, Louisville, Madison, Memphis, Mesa, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Nashville, New
York City, Newark, North Las Vegas, Oakland, Oklahoma City, Omaha, Orlando, Pasadena,
Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland, Redwood City, Reno, Rialto, Richmond (CA), Riverside, Rochester, Sacramento, San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, San Leandro,
San Mateo, Santa Ana, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, Seattle, Spokane, St. Louis, St. Paul, St.
Petersburg, Stockton, Tampa, Toledo, Tucson, Tulsa, and Wichita.
160 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Baltimore City Police Department and the Baltimore City Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. Unit I: Fiscal Years
2014–2016 [hereinafter Balt. Police Union Memorandum]; Memorandum of Understanding No.
24 Between the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Protective League (2011) [hereinafter L.A. Police Union Memorandum].
161 See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7 Effective 2012–2017 arts. 8, 10 (describing employee
security and nondiscrimination provisions).
162 See, e.g., Labor Agreement Between the Government of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and the Fraternal Order of Police MPD Labor Committee: Effective FY 2004–FY 2008 art. 19; L.A. Police Union Memorandum, supra note 160, arts. 8–10;
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Anaheim Police Association and the City of
Anaheim January 8, 2010–July 7, 2011 art. 55.
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trary management discipline for violations of detailed rules, it is unsurprising that many union contracts include quite specific provisions
protecting police officers in discipline cases.163 But union contracts
have little to say about how police officers actually do their job. This is
in part because police unions, like other public and private sector unions in the 1960s, focused on gaining the power to bargain over economic issues, promotions, and discipline.164 But it is also because state
legislatures, courts, and public employee relations boards insisted that
it is the province of management to decide the mission and methods
of public work, and the only things on which labor has a right to negotiate are pay, promotion, and protection against discipline.165 That police unions adopted a narrow conception of the union’s role in
collaborating with management about policing policy and tactics is not
surprising, given the dominant conception of policing and the business
unionism of the mid-twentieth century. The top-down hierarchy in police departments allowed for little input by the rank-and-file, and labor law and labor policy excluded employees from meaningful voice
in the goals of the organization.166
An example of this hierarchy in practice is the Meyers-MiliasBrown Act (“MMBA”),167 the California statute governing police labor relations that is relatively typical of state labor relations statutes.168 The scope of the union’s right to negotiate and represent
public employees includes
all matters relating to employment conditions and employeremployee relations, including, but not limited to, wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, ex163 See, e.g., Balt. Police Union Memorandum, supra note 160, arts. 6, 16; see also Kelling &
Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 199–201.
164 Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 197; see also Karoliszyn, supra note 9.
165 See Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 198.
166 See id. at 199.
167 Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, 1968 Cal. Stat. 2725 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 3500–3511).
168 More accurately, the MMBA is typical of the subset of state public sector labor statutes
that grant full collective bargaining rights to government employees. Some states (e.g., Virginia
and North Carolina) prohibit public employee bargaining entirely, some (e.g., Wisconsin and
Tennessee) sharply limit it, and some (e.g., Missouri) have a patchwork of rules that leave the
status and functions of public employee unions to the development of local practice. See MALIN
ET AL., supra note 19, at 367–69 (noting that “[a]t the turn of the twenty-first century, there were
more than 110 separate public-sector labor laws”; “[t]wenty-nine states . . . allowed collective
bargaining for all . . . public employees”; thirteen allowed bargaining only for some types of
employees; and eight did not allow any public worker bargaining); Indep.-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 135–40 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (detailing Missouri bargaining
rules).
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cept, however, that the scope of representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or organization
of any service or activity provided by law or executive
order.169
The two clauses conflict—read alone, they could respectively “encompass practically any conceivable bargaining proposal” or “swallow
the whole provision for collective negotiation and relegate determination of all labor issues to the city’s discretion.”170 Even if an employer’s action or policy has a significant and adverse effect on the
employees’ wages, hours, and working conditions, the employer may
be exempt from the duty to meet and confer with the union if the
subject is the “merits, necessity, or organization” of government action.171 Added in 1968, the limitation on the union’s right to confer
over these matters “was intended to ‘forestall any expansion of the
language of “wages, hours and working conditions” to include more
general managerial policy decisions.’”172
Police officers in California, therefore, are able to bargain for the
right to consult with a union representative or attorney prior to making a report concerning any shooting incident involving an officer. In
Long Beach Police Officer Ass’n v. City of Long Beach,173 the City
Police Chief “issued a directive prohibiting the City’s police officers
who became involved in a shooting from consulting with a representative of the [association] or an attorney prior to the filing of a written
or oral report concerning such incident” because previous instances
had resulted in interference with the Department’s investigation.174
The court found the right to consult was a “working condition” under
the collective bargaining agreement rather than a matter reserved for
management which would permit the Department to change practices
without prior written agreement or compliance with statutory meet
and confer procedures.175
169 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3504 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 791 of 2016 Reg. Sess., Ch. 8
of 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot).
170 Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 188 v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 245 P.3d 845, 852
(Cal. 2011) (quoting Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 526 P.2d 971, 976 (Cal.
1974)).
171 GOV’T § 3504; Claremont Police Officer’s Ass’n v. City of Claremont, 139 P.3d 532, 536
(Cal. 2006).
172 Claremont Police Officer’s Ass’n, 139 P.3d at 537 (quoting Fire Fighters Union, Local
1186, 526 P.2d at 976).
173

203 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1984).

174

Id. at 496.

175

Id. at 504–05.
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However, although a police officer is allowed to have a representative after a shooting has occurred, policies governing the use of force
before a shooting are not subject to bargaining under the MMBA. In
San Jose Peace Officer’s Ass’n v. City of San Jose,176 a California appellate court found that the police chief’s issuance of a new policy
governing the use of force without meeting and conferring with the
association did not violate the MMBA. Although a change on the policy governing a police officer’s ability to “fire at a suspected criminal”
has “some effect” on safety, it is “equally true” that the “use of force
policy is as closely akin to a managerial decision as any decision can
be in running a police department, surpassed only by the decision as
to whether force will be used at all.”177 According to the court, there
are “few decisions more ‘managerial’ in nature than the one which
involves the conditions under which an entity of the state will permit a
human life to be taken.”178
Police unions have been excluded under this law from involvement in certain proceedings of civilian review commissions. In Berkeley Police Ass’n v. City of Berkeley,179 Berkeley established, through
an initiative, a civilian police review commission.180 The function of
the commission was to “provide for community participation in setting
and reviewing police department policies, practices, and procedures
and to provide a means for prompt, impartial and fair investigation of
complaints brought by individuals against the Berkeley Police Department.”181 The chief of police announced that a member of the commission would attend Department Board of Review hearings during
which bureau reports were discussed, and send a representative of the
Department to each police review commission trial board meeting
who would “take with him a copy of any bureau reports that had been
prepared concerning individuals who were being investigated by the
police review commission and answer questions of commission members concerning the department’s position on the complaints.”182 The
court noted that the police association was fundamentally challenging
the “announced policies” of their chief officer “concerning . . . policecommunity relations,” and “[t]hese policies clearly constitute manage176

144 Cal. Rptr. 638, 646–47 (Ct. App. 1978).

177

Id. at 645.

178

Id.

179

143 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Ct. App. 1977).

180

Id. at 258.

181

Id.

182

Id.
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ment level decisions which are not properly within the scope of union
representation and collective bargaining.”183
Although a police association is able to bargain for the right of an
officer to consult with a union representative or attorney prior to
making a report concerning any shooting incident involving the officer,184 a police department can prevent officers from “huddling” together before making reports. In Ass’n for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles,185 the Department instituted an
anti-huddling policy, where officers would gather in groups of two or
more with a union representation, “i.e., two or more deputies consulting at the same time with the same legal counsel/labor representative.”186 The City created a policy where individuals involved,
including witnesses, could not discuss the shooting amongst themselves, but still had the right to meet with counsel individually.187 The
court found that the revision “had no effect on wages and hours.”188 In
contrast, the court found that “the Department’s express objective in
implementing its policy revision was to collect accurate information
regarding deputy-involved shootings. Plainly, the purpose of the policy revision was to foster greater public trust in the investigatory process,” and was a fundamental managerial decision.189 Finally, in a
recent case, a county’s adoption of a policy to limit a deputy sheriff’s
access the internal investigative file before being interviewed by an
internal affairs investigator was found not to be a working condition
subject to bargaining under the MMBA.190
While it is understandable that California, like other states, would
want to free police departments from the leverage a union might have
to block reforms through prolonged bargaining and through inclusion
of contract terms that could thwart new policies, the consequence of
Id. at 260.
Long Beach Police Officer Ass’n v. City of Long Beach, 203 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504–05 (Ct.
App. 1984).
185 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (Ct. App. 2008).
186 Id. at 498.
187 Id. at 499–500.
188 Id. at 510.
189 Id.
190 See Ass’n of Orange Cty. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Orange, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 135,
146–47 (Ct. App. 2013) (“The change in practice implemented by the Sheriff’s order, therefore,
. . . constitutes a fundamental managerial decision, falling within the Department’s ‘freedom to
manage its affairs unrelated to employment.’ The Association does not identify any results from,
or effects of, the Sheriff’s order, which are subject to bargaining.”) (citation omitted) (quoting
Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 188 v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 245 P.3d 845, 852 (Cal.
2011)).
183
184
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the limited duty to bargain has been perverse. If employees and their
union are excluded from participation in policy-setting, they often feel
compelled to oppose new policies for fear that the policy will be implemented punitively or unfairly as a way to discipline rank-and-file
who are unpopular with management.191 In the case of police, as scholars have shown, unions become reflexively opposed to policies when
they cannot participate in policy design, and focus instead simply on
protecting their members from discipline for violating the policy.192
Thus, both the law and the dominant theory of policing compel union
leadership to focus their attention on rectifying the abuses of management: arbitrary dismissals, scheduling, and work assignments; informal
discipline; citation and arrest quotas; cronyism in promotions; and incursions into officers’ personal lives.
3. Police Unions and the Political Process
While police unions adopted a narrow view of labor’s role in setting criminal justice policy in the workplace, apart from officer pay
and discipline, they embraced a broad view of how they could advocate for police officers’ interests as labor. They do not just bargain and
enforce labor agreements; they are involved in electoral politics, in
litigation, and in the media, attacking the restrictions imposed on
them by the Supreme Court, criticizing groups ranging from the Black
Lives Matter movement to the Communist Party to the American
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), and opposing civilian oversight.193
And in advocating for police interests as labor to be protected from
civilian intervention and unfair discipline, of course, they did have a
substantial impact on criminal justice policy. That is, although unions
did not contest management efforts to adopt the militarized style of
urban policing instead of a more social service or community-oriented
style, they did demand that officers be protected from discipline when
that harsh style of policing resulted in civilian injuries or deaths. Police
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
193 See generally Timothy D. Chandler & Rafael Gely, Protective Service Unions, Political
Activities, and Bargaining Outcomes, 5 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 295, 312–13 (1995) (finding that electoral political activity by police and firefighter unions is a more important determinant of wages and employment levels than unionization); Casey Ichniowski et al., Collective
Bargaining Laws, Threat Effects, and the Determination of Police Compensation, 7 J. LAB. ECON.
191, 191, 205–06 (1989) (finding that “[s]tate laws that provide stronger bargaining rights and
ensure closure to the bargaining process increase the direct effect of police unions on compensation”); see also Police Union Pressures Amazon.com to Halt “Black Lives Matter” Sales, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.democracynow.org/2016/12/27/headlines/police_union_
pressures_amazoncom_to_halt_black_lives_matter_sales.
191
192
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unions negotiated for contractual protections in the disciplinary process and also lobbied for state or municipal laws giving officers procedural protections during discipline.194
Police unions also actively opposed reform-oriented chiefs and civilian review boards, both for reasons of conservative and sometimes
racist ideology and to protect police officers’ bread-and-butter interests, like pay, benefits, and job security.195 In several cities, police unions have challenged police chiefs brought in to enact reforms that
they consider threatening to officer safety or economic interests, or
that they believe weaken public safety. Unions challenged city officials over issues like staffing and job protection. Many have taken
openly partisan stands—such as recent police protests in New York—
194 See generally Levine, supra note 20, at 1220–27. As noted in the DOJ Chicago Report,
some barriers to accountability for misconduct are also created by management without apparent legislative or union-negotiated pressure. The DOJ stated:
Our investigation revealed that the City fails to conduct any investigation of nearly
half of police misconduct complaints and that a number of institutional barriers
contribute to this fact. There are provisions in the City’s agreements with the unions that impede the investigative process, such as the general requirement that a
complainant sign a sworn affidavit and limitations on investigating anonymous
complaints and older incidents of misconduct. That said, the union agreements contain override provisions for some of these provisions that the City rarely utilizes.
Other barriers have been created solely by the City, such as internal policies allowing investigative agencies to truncate investigations of serious misconduct
through mediation, administratively close complaints deemed less serious, and ignore mandatory investigations into uses of force that could identify misconduct or
faulty training issues.
DOJ CHI. REP., supra note 10, at 47. The DOJ also found procedures used in the circumstances
where investigations are conducted hampered the search for truth and its description of those
procedures makes clear that blame for them is widespread:
Witnesses and accused officers are frequently not interviewed at all, or not interviewed until long after the incident when memories have faded. When interviews
do occur, questioning is often biased in favor of officers, and witness coaching by
union attorneys is prevalent and unimpeded—a dynamic neither we nor our law
enforcement experts had seen to nearly such an extent in other agencies. Investigators routinely fail to collect probative evidence. The procedures surrounding investigations allow for ample opportunity for collusion among officers and are devoid
of any rules prohibiting such coordination. We found that a lack of resources and
investigative training contribute to these investigative problems. We also found that
investigations foundered because of the pervasive cover-up culture among CPD
officers, which the accountability entities accept as an immutable fact rather than
something to root out.
Id.
195 See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE AGONY OF THE AMERICAN LEFT 206–07 (1969); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 274–78 (1969); John Thomas Delaney & Peter
Feuille, Police, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 265, 301 (David B. Lipsky
& Clifford B. Donn eds., 1987); see also STEPHEN C. HALPERN, POLICE-ASSOCIATION AND DEPARTMENT LEADERS 93–99 (1974).
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against politicians who they claim adopt policies that weaken public
safety.196 Because police officers have long felt at risk of arbitrary or
unfair discipline, they have fought hard to retain union involvement in
internal investigations into employee misconduct, and therefore have
stymied efforts to reform police culture.197 The January 2017 DOJ Chicago Report, for example, noted that a 1994 effort to use data to identify patterns of problematic officer behavior was opposed by the union
because officers felt discipline was imposed arbitrarily and unfairly;
the system was abandoned after just two years, and all the data and
reports it produced “went missing.”198 A 2016 effort to analyze data
and create an early intervention system is in the works, but the DOJ
Chicago Report stated:
[T]he project managers are taking guidance from the City on
how and when to do so—and union involvement has not yet
occurred. There is no evidence that the City or CPD engaged
with the unions early on, before beginning this new effort, to
determine whether CPD’s unions will support the new
effort.199
As these examples suggest, unions have been blocked, by labor law,
by the hierarchical management structure, and by short-sighted union
leaders’ own narrow conception of role, from adopting a more proactive and collaborative approach to management-labor cooperation
over police goals and tactics.
In sum, police unions see their mission as protecting the interests
of police officers, including protecting officers from discipline, ensuring good working conditions, and protecting seniority. When police
union leaders defend officers involved in what appear to be egregious
instances of violence toward suspects, critics assert that the solidarity
that enables a union to function, and that is encouraged by the quasimilitaristic culture in many police forces, has become pathological.200
Whereas unions are thought by their defenders to be an institutional
mechanism to create and sustain workplace democracy in other work
196 See Alex Altman, Why New York Cops Turned Their Backs on Mayor de Blasio, TIME
(Dec. 22, 2014), http://time.com/3644168/new-york-police-de-blasio-wenjian-liu-rafael-ramos/;
see also Josh Dawsey, New York City Police Vent Frustrations at Mayor de Blasio, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 1, 2016, 9:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-police-vent-frustrations-atmayor-de-blasio-1470100169.
197 Karoliszyn, supra note 9.
198 DOJ CHI. REP., supra note 10, at 117.
199 Id. at 118.
200 See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 455–56 (2004).
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settings, law enforcement unions are perceived as irredeemably oligarchic and implacably opposed to even modest reform and to anything
that might weaken the influence of union leaders.201
II.

POLICE UNIONS

AS

OBSTACLES

TO

REFORM

Police unions in New York City, Ferguson, Baltimore, Cleveland,
Chicago, and other cities have, at least initially, publicly come to the
defense of officers accused of shooting and killing civilians, insisting
that it is important to avoid a “rush to judgment.”202 Reponses have
gone beyond offering a public defense to include fundraising for accused officers in Ferguson, Baltimore, and Cleveland,203 and, in New
York City, proclaiming “[i]t is time to stop the amateur video activists
who interfere with police operations” by recording arrests and police
violence.204 Though New York Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association
(“PBA”) President Patrick Lynch uses extreme rhetoric in his defense
of officers,205 refusing to publicly concede that an officer was wrong,
Id.
See, e.g., Justin George, New Online Fundraising Campaign Starts Up for Officers
Charged in Gray’s Death, BALT. SUN (May 6, 2015, 12:34 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-officers-fund-20150506-story.html. After the
Baltimore police union’s GoFundMe site was shut down by the company because GoFundMe
pages cannot benefit people charged with “serious violations of the law,” the union backed fundraising on a site devoted specifically to raising money for law enforcement officers. Id. Union
president Gene Ryan said the charges against the officers were “an apparent rush to judgment.”
Id.
203 See id.; Sarah Parvini, GoFundMe Shuts Down Fund-Raising Page for Baltimore Police,
L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-gofundme-baltimorecops-20150502-story.html; Lorrie Taylor, Cleveland Police Union to Raffle Gun in Fundraiser for
Officer Accused of Shooting Teen, FOX 8 CLEVELAND (July 28, 2015, 5:44 PM), http://fox8.com/
2015/07/28/cleveland-police-union-to-raffle-gun-in-fundraiser-for-officer-accused-of-shootingteen/ (reporting that “[t]he Cleveland Police Patrolman’s Union has come under fire for raffling
off a Glock pistol to raise money for an officer accused of shooting an unarmed teenager” and
that the union president said no offense was ever intended and explained, “Raffling off a Glock
in a police community is like raffling off M&Ms at a kid’s birthday party”); Christopher Zara,
Officer Darren Wilson GoFundMe: Donations Halted as Organizers Sort Out Legal Questions,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/officer-darren-wilson-go
fundme-donations-halted-organizers-sort-out-legal-questions-1676430 (reporting that a
GoFundMe page started by an anonymous donor raised almost a half-million dollars for Officer
Wilson and his defense fund).
204 Press Release, N.Y.C. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, Pat Lynch Says 35-Second
Video Doesn’t Tell Whole Story and that Resisting or Interfering with Arrest is Illegal (Oct. 7,
2014), https://www.nycpba.org/archive/releases/14/pr141007-video.html [https://perma.cc/8RPY3KC6].
205 See David Firestone, The NYC Police Union Has a Long History of Bullying City Hall,
QUARTZ (Dec. 23, 2014), http://qz.com/317338/the-nyc-police-union-has-a-long-history-of-bullying-city-hall/. A full collection of press releases can be found on the PBA’s website: https://
www.nycpba.org/releases/index.html.
201
202
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even when the officer in question went to jail,206 his milder statements
about the role of the police union are not unusual among police union
leaders. He says what most do: “Our job, as an advocate for police
officers, is to speak out for them, whether it’s getting them a contract
or defending them when they’re wrongfully accused, or explaining exactly how and why we do our job. That’s our role, and we proudly do
it.”207
Although it is understandable that elected union leaders come to
the defense of employees accused of misconduct, the zeal and leverage that police unions bring to the defense is considerable. As a result
of contractual and statutory substantive and procedural protections,
the expense and hassle necessary to discipline an officer is greater
than if the officer could be fired at will.208 This, combined with the fact
that labor arbitrators sometimes reduce punishment, “makes supervisors less likely to impose disciplinary sanctions because while a supervisor faces a possible headache for not disciplining a misbehaving
subordinate, they face a certain headache if they do.”209
One study of discipline imposed in the CPD in the early 1990s
found that arbitrators “routinely cut in half” the severity of discipline.210 Experience with the personnel system prompted Tom Nolan,
a veteran of the Boston Police Department and professor of criminology, to say: “The number one impediment to reforming policing in the
United States are police unions.”211 Similarly, in 2016, the Chicago Police Accountability Task Force issued a report concluding that “[t]he
collective bargaining agreements between the police unions and the
City have essentially turned the code of silence into official policy.”212
As explained in this Part, statutory and contractual protections for poKaroliszyn, supra note 9.
PBA President Talks Re-Election, Contracts & More, NY1: INSIDE CITY HALL (June 1,
2015, 9:40 PM), http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/inside-city-hall/2015/06/1/ny1-online--pbapresident-talks-re-election--contracts---more.html (statement at 2:20); see Edgar Sandoval &
Reuven Blau, Rev. Al Sharpton Rips Police Union President for Criticizing Man Who Taped
Cops Arresting Eric Garner, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/nyc-crime/killed-eric-garner-distraught-article-1.1890415 (quoting PBA
President Patrick Lynch as saying that Ramsey Orta, the man who caught the fatal Garner arrest
on video, was “demonizing” officers and was a “criminal” because he was arrested for allegedly
trying to hand off a stolen gun).
208 See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
209 Stoughton, supra note 27, at 2211–12.
210 Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary?, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 216 (1998).
211 Karoliszyn, supra note 9.
212 POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 14 (2016),
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf.
206

R

207

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841837

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-3\GWN302.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 38

13-JUL-17

POLICE UNIONS

13:34

749

lice officers do have an effect on police accountability and the transparency of police disciplinary systems.213 For instance, collective
bargaining agreements often contain provisions that protect officers
accused of misconduct, shield them from civilian oversight, and limit
the ability to change officers’ conditions of employment, which also
makes it difficult to enact reforms such as setting up early warning
systems.214
A. Statutory and Contractual Limits on Discipline and
Transparency
In the wake of extensive news coverage of and social media outrage about police shootings from 2014 through 2017, a group affiliated
with Black Lives Matter launched a project known as Campaign Zero
in part to draw public attention to job protections for police officers
accused of misconduct.215 Campaign Zero compiled a database of police union contracts for over eighty American cities, including every
major city and a significant number of smaller cities, by obtaining the
contracts through Freedom of Information Act requests.216 Another
source of recent data about police union contracts comes from a
breach of the website of the country’s largest police union, the FOP.
Hackers obtained and then leaked to The Guardian newspaper nearly
two decades’ worth of police union contracts, apparently wanting to
draw attention to contractual protections that made it more difficult
to discipline officers accused of misconduct.217 A third important
source of police union contracts was compiled by Professor Stephen
Rushin.218
See JOHN DECARLO & MICHAEL J. JENKINS, LABOR UNIONS, MANAGEMENT INNOVAORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 2–3 (M.R. Haberfield ed.,
2015); WALKER, supra note 90, at 379–80; Walker, supra note 28, at 101 (collecting sources and
noting “it is widely believed—but not investigated or proven—that police unions stifle good
management in general, [and] innovation in particular”); Emmanuel, supra note 147.
214 See DECARLO & JENKINS, supra note 213, at 2; WALKER, supra note 90, at 374; Walker,
supra note 28, at 102; Emmanuel, supra note 147.
213

TION AND

R
R
R
R

215 Kyle Jaeger, The Black Lives Matter Activists Have a Plan: Campaign Zero, ATTN:
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.attn.com/stories/2906/what-is-campaign-zero-black-lives-matter.

See DERAY MCKESSON ET AL., CAMPAIGN ZERO, POLICE UNION CONTRACTS AND POBILL OF RIGHTS ANALYSIS 4 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be
4b08ef197467542/t/5773f695f7e0abbdfe28a1f0/1467217560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Union
+Contract+Report.pdf.
216

LICE

217 See George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary Records Will
Be Kept Secret, GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/
feb/07/leaked-police-files-contain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret.
218

See Rushin, supra note 20, apps. A, B.
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All three of these sources of police union contracts reveal several
contractual or statutory job protections that are potentially problematic for reform efforts. Some slow down misconduct investigations,
prevent public access to complaints and disciplinary records, and enable the destruction of complaints and disciplinary records after a negotiated period of time.219 Procedural protections for officers during
interrogation can make it difficult for investigators to recover accurate
information about uses of force. Transparency about how misconduct
allegations are handled and accountability for officers who engage in
misconduct are hampered by limits on civilian oversight, short statutes
of limitation for misconduct charges against officers, and restrictions
on which complaints will be investigated, including refusing to investigate anonymous complaints.220 In the approximately twenty states
with statutory LEOBORs, many of these protections exist as a matter
of state law and thus even elimination of the police union or its contract would not immediately change the law unless the statute were
repealed as well.221 This Article highlights the contractual and statutory protections that pose the most significant obstacles to reforms.
The power of police unions to negotiate over terms of employment
and disciplinary processes, which is at the core of the collective bargaining process in any unionized workplace, will be essential to consider in any serious approach to police reform.
Timing and Conduct of Interrogation. Most collective bargaining
agreements and state LEOBORs outline the process for investigating
allegations of officer misconduct, although the process varies.222 Maryland, for example, provides that no officer may be questioned without
having been given the opportunity to secure legal counsel and gives
officers ten days to do so.223 This provision has been criticized for giving officers plenty of time to delay interrogations and concoct an account of the incident that exonerates the officer.224 Other provisions
on officer interrogation include regulation of the location, length, and
timing of interrogations.225
219

Id. at 1212, 1220 fig.1.

220

Id. at 1196–97.

Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 222 & n.42 (counting twenty LEBORs).
221

R

222

See Keenan & Walker, supra note 20, at 203.

223

MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(j)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2011).

224

See Walker, supra note 20, at 3.

R

225

See Keenan & Walker, supra note 20, at 217–19.
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Handling of Personnel Files. Officer personnel files contain
records of complaints and their outcomes. Issues concerning those
files include whether the public should have access to any of them
and, if so, what information should be disclosed. Additional issues include whether records should be expunged after a period of time and,
if so, which records and for what length of time.226
Proposed legislation that failed to pass in California in 2016
would have increased public access to police disciplinary records that
have been restricted by state law and limited by court decisions.227 The
bill would have required public access to records of all investigations
into uses of force that result in death or serious injury.228 The records
would be open even if the officer involved eventually was found to
have complied with a department’s policy.229 Currently, the LAPD
only releases summaries, and some departments don’t even provide a
summary.230 The bill would also have required that other reports and
findings be made public when officers are found to have engaged in
misconduct that violates the legal rights of the public.231 A similar bill
failed to pass in 2007 “after dozens of peace officers testified to
lawmakers that permitting public access to police disciplinary files
would endanger lives.”232 Yet, according to a news report, there has
been no reported case where an officer was harmed based on release
of this information.233 Other police departments, including Baltimore,
similarly do not release notice of disciplinary actions and their
disposition.234
In contrast, at least ten states including Texas and Florida already
“provide public access to investigative details, findings, and disciplinary actions when officers are found to have acted improperly.”235
Since 2014, Dallas has maintained websites listing every officer-involved shooting and every officer use of force in response to resistance since 2008 along with the location, the name of the subject,
Id. at 235.
S. 1286, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
228 See id.; see also Patrick McGreevy, Lawmaker Proposes Giving Public Access to Police
Shooting and Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016, 11:57 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
politics/la-pol-ca-cop-records-story.html.
229 See Cal. S. 1286; see also McGreevy, supra note 228.
230 See McGreevy, supra note 228.
231 See Cal. S. 1286; see also McGreevy, supra note 228.
232 McGreevy, supra note 228.
233 See id.
234 Balt. Police Union Memorandum, supra note 160, art. 16(K).
235 See McGreevy, supra note 228.
226
227
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whether the subject was armed, and the name or badge number, race,
and gender of the officers involved.236
The challenge with public access to disciplinary records is balancing transparency with protection of legitimate privacy and safety interests of police officers. From one point of view, transparency is clearly
desirable as the public should be able to monitor how public employees are disciplined, and this is especially important to restoring public
trust in police.237 From another, the value of transparency is a function
of the reliability of the records. Police officers who feel that discipline
is used unfairly to punish officers or is meted out based on favoritism
or for other nonmeritorious reasons would conclude that public accessibility of the records will only compound the harm of the unfair discipline by stigmatizing an officer and might facilitate reprisals if the
officer’s name and home address are released.238 Conversely, officers
who feel that discipline is fair might still be reluctant to allow their
name to be publicized, but at least recognize that public awareness is
not unreasonable or grossly unfair.239
As for expungement, many cities allow for expungement of complaints.240 Baltimore’s union contract allows officers to request expungement of formal complaints that are found to be unfounded or as
to which the officer was exonerated after three years.241 Some policing
scholars assert that expungement of unfounded complaints is undesirable because such records are part of early intervention systems mandated by DOJ consent decrees. These systems create a computerized
record of multiple performance indicators, including uses of force and
citizen complaints, that allow supervisors and oversight entities to
have a full picture of every officer’s job performance.242
Civilian Complaints and Oversight. Some LEOBORs and contracts impose short statutes of limitations on the prosecution of disci236 See Dallas Police Officer-Involved Shootings, DALLAS OPENDATA, https://www.dallas
opendata.com/Police/Dallas-Police-Public-Data-Officer-Involved-Shootin/4gmt-jyx2 (last visited
Apr. 6, 2017); Police: 2015 Response to Resistance, DALLAS OPENDATA, https://www.dallasopen
data.com/dataset/Police-2015-Response-to-Resistance/594v-2cnd (last updated Feb. 10, 2017);
Leon Neyfakh, A Police Department That’s Embraced Reform, SLATE (July 8, 2016, 12:10 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2016/07/the_dallas_police_department_
has_been_a_model_for_reducing_officer_involved.html.
237

Walker, supra note 20, at 7.

R

238

See Joseph, supra note 217.

R

239

See id.

240

See id.

241

Rushin, supra note 20, at 1196–97.

R

242

See Keenan & Walker, supra note 20, at 235.
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pline.243 In Maryland, for example, no complaint alleging brutality will
be investigated or be the basis of discipline if filed more than ninety
days after the alleged incident.244 Others treat citizen complaints differently than complaints initiated by other officers.245 Other provisions
limit civilian oversight.246 For many police unions, limiting civilian
oversight is one of their most important issues.247
Misconduct Investigations. Several types of contractual and statutory provisions governing investigations have been criticized. One
provision concerns the timing of such investigations and who should
conduct them.248 Other constellations of concerns focus on control of
the hearing boards that determine whether officers have committed
misconduct.249 In Los Angeles in the decades before the Rampart
scandal, rank-and-file officers believed that the Board of Rights was
controlled by the chief who used it to punish whistleblowers and dissenters.250 In Baltimore, perhaps for a similar reason, the union negotiated a contractual provision requiring that one member of every
hearing board be a peer officer of the accused.251 A critic, however,
243 Police Officer Bill of Rights laws reviewed include: California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3301–3311 (West 2010); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9200–9209 (2015); FLA. STAT § 112.532 (2016); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725/3
(West 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.520 (West 2010); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2531 (Westlaw
through the 2017 First Extraordinary session); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-101 to 3-113
(LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. § 626.89 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 289.020–.120 (LexisNexis 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-14-4 (2013); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28.6-2 (2007); VA. CODE
ANN. § 9.1-501 (2012); W. VA. CODE § 8-14A-2 (LexisNexis 2012); WIS. STAT. § 164.01–.06
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 2).
244 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2011).
245 See supra note 243. See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Municipal Liability for Failure to
Investigate Citizen Complaints Against the Police, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209, 216–22 (1998)
(describing civilian complaint review procedures).
246 See supra note 243. See generally EDUARDO L. CALDERON & MARIA HERNANDEZFIGUEROA, CITIZEN OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 7–8 (2013), http://
cpp.fullerton.edu/pdf/Citizen%20Oversight.pdf (discussing impediments to the establishment of
civilian oversight committees).
247 CALDERON & HERNANDEZ-FIGUEROA, supra note 246, at 8. Ironically, sometimes civilian oversight results in more leniency towards officers. See, e.g., Kate Mather & David Zahniser,
A Proposal to Give Civilians More Say in LAPD’s Disciplinary System Could End Up More
Lenient on Officers, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-lapd-discipline-change-20170109-story.html (noting a study which “showed that civilian
members of the boards that weigh major LAPD discipline cases are ‘consistently more lenient’
than their sworn counterparts, frequently voting to acquit officers or dole out lesser
punishments”).
248 Walker, supra note 20, at 3.
249 Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 563.
250 Id. at 607.
251 Balt. Police Union Memorandum, supra note 160, art. 16(C)(3).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841837

R

R

R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-3\GWN302.txt

754

unknown

Seq: 43

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

13-JUL-17

13:34

[Vol. 85:712

insisted that “including a peer officer as a member of the Hearing
Board serves to protect misconduct” because “giving the rank and file
a direct voice in disciplinary investigation . . . necessarily lowers the
standards for police conduct” inasmuch as officers have “a vested interest in shielding all officers from meaningful investigations and discipline.”252 Other provisions concern whether the public should receive
notice of the disposition of investigations.253
The provisions highlighted above can be obstacles to reforms in
that they make it harder for supervisors, civilian oversight boards, and
the public to determine the nature and extent of police misconduct, to
develop early intervention systems to help officers who are at risk of
committing future abuse, and to remove officers who have committed
egregious misconduct. Police unions, however, have defended these
provisions. The FOP, for example, said these types of provisions are
necessary to protect officers from unfounded citizen complaints.254 As
the former President of the Federal Agents’ Police Benevolent Association and founder of the National Police Defense Foundation, a nonprofit that provides legal services to members of law enforcement, put
it: “What is happening now is police are second-guessing their instincts and training they have because they’re scared to get indicted,
that they may have to go to jail for doing their job.”255 This alleged
reluctance to do the job, which some have called the Ferguson Effect,256 is the latest iteration of a longstanding argument that unions
are necessary to protect police from the anti-police rhetoric.
As explained further in Parts III and IV, police unions have
fought hard for many of these procedural and substantive protections
because they do not trust the process of adopting and implementing
policies. But reform will not be accomplished simply by eliminating
job protections, even if that were politically feasible. Nor will reform
be accomplished simply by involving the public in negotiating over job
protections, at least so long as the rank-and-file retain the collective
will to resist reforms, discipline is subject to grievance arbitration, and
252 Walker, supra note 20, at 5 (emphasis removed). Campaign Zero also calls for eliminating police officer influence from disciplinary boards and setting up an independent process. See
Independent Investigations and Prosecutions, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.
org/investigations [https://perma.cc/5AFE-J8T4] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
253 See Walker, supra note 20, at 7.
254 Karoliszyn, supra note 9.
255 Id.
256 See Neil Gross, Opinion, Is There a ‘Ferguson Effect’?, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY REV.
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/opinion/sunday/is-there-a-fergusoneffect.html.
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negotiating disputes are subject to interest arbitration. And it is politically infeasible (and may well be unwise) to eliminate a process to
appeal discipline. Rather, rank-and-file need to be involved in improving police practices, and that involvement very likely requires the cooperation of some kind of officer labor representative.
B. Other Limits on Reform
1. Changing Conditions of Employment
In addition to protection against discipline, accountability, and
transparency, many states have laws that require management to collectively bargain over any changes to conditions of employment.257
This requirement can also stymie reform efforts. For instance, federal
law empowers the DOJ to bring structural reform litigation against
police departments engaged in a “pattern or practice” of civil rights
abuses.258 Most of the investigations conducted by the DOJ have resulted in consent decrees that are approved and overseen by federal
courts.259 An investigation of seventeen of these consent decrees negotiated between 1997 and 2016 found that in at least seven of them, the
union contract with the city hindered the reforms contained in the
consent decree.260
Unsurprisingly, unions, and sometimes classes of union members,
have filed grievances when these reforms change working conditions.
In Seattle, for instance, two police unions filed a lawsuit in 2013 arguing that “certain topics that have long been subjected to bargaining—
including conditions for employment . . . could be severely curtailed by
the city’s proposed police reform plan.”261 The plan included provisions that the Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) would be monitored
to determine “whether all use of force is reported[,] . . . tracked, and
properly classified, and thoroughly and objectively investigated and
reviewed to a reasonable and unbiased conclusion,” and also
“whether disciplinary results on founded complaints reflect the seriousness of the underlying event . . . with biased policing, excessive
Karoliszyn, supra note 9.
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012). See generally Armacost, supra note 200, at 525–31; Harmon,
supra note 20, at 804–05; Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2015).
259 See Armacost, supra note 200, at 527–30 (describing DOJ’s frequent use of consent
decrees).
260 Emmanuel, supra note 147.
261 Cienna Madrid, Seattle Police Union Files Lawsuit to Block Police Reform Plan, STRANGER: SLOG (Mar. 11, 2013, 3:08 PM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2013/03/11/seattlepolice-union-file-lawsuit-to-block-police-reform-plan.
257
258
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force, failure to report force, or dishonesty meriting appropriate discipline.”262 The lawsuit asked the court to “permanently block the city
and court monitor from making any changes to police officers’ wages,
hours, or working conditions.”263 DOJ consent decrees aimed at reform of police departments often include language providing that any
reforms can only occur to the extent that they do not conflict with the
union contract.264 These provisions can delay or permanently hinder
reform efforts.265
2. Union Structure
Unions are run by an elected president and board of directors.266
In large departments, the individuals holding these full-time paid positions control a multimillion-dollar budget amassed from union dues.267
This gives them enormous power to influence public policy because
they can donate a portion of these funds to politicians viewed as
friendly to their interests.268 A case in point is Seattle.
The Seattle Police Officers’ Guild (“SPOG”), the union of rankand-file officers, endorsed Ed Murray for Mayor in 2013 and contributed $15,000 to his campaign.269 Upon his taking office, one of his first
262 Id. (emphasis removed; ellipses in original). This occurred prior to Smith taking office in
2014. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
263 Madrid, supra note 261 (emphasis removed). In 2014, a class of union members, and not
the union itself, filed a lawsuit to block the use of force reforms contained in the DOJ consent
decree with the City, contending that the policies put officers’ lives in danger. Steve Miletich et
al., Seattle Cops Sue over DOJ Reforms, SEATTLE TIMES (May. 29, 2014, 1:56 PM), http://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-cops-sue-over-doj-reforms.
264 Emmanuel, supra note 147. For instance, the consent decree between the DOJ and
Pittsburgh in 1997 includes the language, “Nothing in this Decree is intended to alter the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of Police.” Id.
265 See supra notes 165–73 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., Agreement by and Between the City of Seattle and Seattle Police Officers’
Guild: Effective Through December 31, 2014 art. 1, http://www.seattle.gov/personnel/resources/
pubs/SPOG.pdf.
267 For example, in Houston, with more than five thousand police officers paying approximately $600 a year in union dues, an annual budget would exceed three million dollars. See
Crime in the United States 2012: Table 78, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/78tabledatadecpdf/table-78-state-cuts/table_78_full_time_law_en
forcement_employees_texas_by_city_2012.xls (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (Houston “Total Law
Enforcement Employees”: 6,663); 2015 Union Dues, HOUSTON POLICE OFFICERS’ UNION, http://
www.hpou.org/2015-union-dues/ [https://perma.cc/V3A7-P2AG] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (indicating the 2015 total union dues owed is $641.04).
268 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
269 Ansel Herz, Amid Contract Negotiations, Seattle Police Union Claims It’s “Under Attack” by Black Lives Matter Activists, STRANGER: SLOG (Dec. 3, 2015, 4:56 PM), http://
www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/2015/12/03/23230986/amid-contract-negotiations-seattle-policeunion-claims-its-under-attack-by-black-lives-matter-activists.
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acts was to demote the interim chief of the department, a man who
had enacted numerous reforms that had been praised in a report by
the federal court monitor of the DOJ consent decree.270 Additionally,
the report praised an assistant chief who also retired suddenly.271 The
Mayor then appointed the former Vice President of SPOG, Harry
Bailey, as interim police chief.272 Bailey immediately attempted to
overturn misconduct findings of numerous officers found guilty of using excessive force.273
The perception that SPOG captured the Mayor existed not only
amongst reformers, but also amongst some members of the rank-andfile. The Mayor’s actions created “an atmosphere of fear.”274 One officer opined that the former Chief and Assistant Chief who the Mayor
forced out were
people who have a deep institutional knowledge of the organization, have been there a long time and earned their way
to the top, and have been chipping away at deficiencies for
three years . . . [.] After a long struggle to make this a better
organization, boom, they are all gone. You bring in new people who are less experienced, and you give them the same
task, but you have erased that last few years of work.275
Another officer, who wanted to remain anonymous to avoid the
possibility of retribution, stated:
If the people who have been opposing the federal court monitor and reform are elevated, . . . [t]here is a risk in working
hard to achieve reform. It sends a message that is, at best,
confusing about whether they want reform to be successful.
Why would you put the fox in charge of the henhouse? . . .
Any risk they take may piss off the folks who are in charge.
I think a lot of us were quite stunned . . . . The mood was
shock—complete shock—because everyone who was involved in reform was gone or buried. People just stopped
talking.276
These quotes reveal how union leadership can stymie reform by
stifling the voices of rank-and-file members who may support reform
270 Dominic Holden, Reform in Reverse, STRANGER (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.thestran
ger.com/seattle/reform-in-reverse/Content?oid=19281433.
271 Id.
272 Herz, supra note 269.
273 Id. Ultimately, Bailey was unable to do so because his actions caused a scandal. See id.
274 Holden, supra note 270.
275 Id. (ellipsis in original).
276 Id.
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efforts. The perception that the Mayor was in bed with the union and
his actions in demoting and forcing out individuals who were working
with the DOJ to institute reforms created fear, silenced more progressive voices amongst the rank-and-file, and made them reluctant to engage in reform-oriented efforts.
Similar suppression of rank-and-file voices occurred in San Francisco, according to a Blue Ribbon Panel appointed by the District Attorney after it was discovered that members of the police department
had exchanged racist and homophobic text messages.277 Among the
panel’s findings was that the union dissuaded officers from speaking
to the panel and many who did speak to the panel did so anonymously
because they feared retaliation from the union and had concerns
about their physical safety.278
The union can also hinder reforms by capturing police management, thereby eliminating any checks and balances with the department. This arguably occurred in Seattle when the former vice
president of the union was elevated to the position of police chief.279
In San Francisco, the Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that there was
virtually no distinction between the command staff of the department
and the police officer’s union.280 This made it difficult to engage in
reforms because the union was essentially running the department and
it had historically taken antireformist positions.281
Finally, one way for union leadership to maintain their power and
influence is to convince rank-and-file officers to join the union and
pay union dues. As such, they must justify why the union is important
for officers, and one persuasive way to do so is to encourage the rankand-file to believe that they cannot trust management and that management is out to get them. This narrative is easy to maintain because
the hierarchical structure of most police departments limits contact
between command staff and the rank-and-file.282
In sum, collective bargaining agreements, including seniority systems, union power over conditions of work, and the structure and incentives of police unions can all be barriers to reform.283 However, this
S.F. BLUE RIBBON PANEL, THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTAFAIRNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016), http://sfblueribbonpanel.com/sites/de
fault/files/BRP_report.pdf [hereinafter PANEL REP.].
278 Id. at 143.
279 See supra notes 269–73 and accompanying text.
280 PANEL REP., supra note 277, at 143.
281 See id.
282 See supra Section I.A.
283 See SKLANSKY, supra note 119, at 82 (“[T]he growing power of police unions made it
277
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does not mean that unions and rank-and-file officers always find reform efforts problematic. Next, this Article provides evidence that unions can be important partners in reform efforts.
III. POLICE UNIONS

AS

AGENTS

OF

POLICE REFORM

In theory, police unions could be agents of reform in at least two
ways. First, as representatives of the line officers who have daily contact with the community whom the police are supposed to protect and
serve, unions could help improve the relationship between police and
citizens, and help ensure that force is used wisely and prudently, and
that arrests are made and citations issued only when doing so actually
improves life for the community. Second, unions could become intermediaries to convey the concerns of line personnel to management
in a way that will improve policing. But to do either of those, unions
would have to develop genuine and sustained enthusiasm for improving the quality of policing.284
Given the prevailing wisdom that police unions are irredeemably
opposed to reforms, it is surprising to learn that while unions fight
hard to ward off discipline for some members,285 doing so does not
necessarily equate with an antireformist position when it comes to
matters unrelated to officer discipline. There is evidence of police unions occasionally working to facilitate reforms that improve the quality of policing. Here we offer a few examples and then draw some
generalizations from them.
A. Examples of Police Unions as Agents of Reform
A number of cities at various points over the last fifty years have
implemented reforms to reduce police violence and improve policecommunity relations. All of them involved the cooperation of the
rank-and-file, and many involved active cooperation with the union.
An early example is the “Friday Crab Club” of the Berkeley Police Department, which was organized by Chief August Vollmer in the
more difficult for departments to explore new strategies of collaborative decision making that
circumvented seniority systems or bypassed the union hierarchy.”); JEROME H. SKOLNICK &
DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE 160 (1986); WALKER, supra note 90, at 380 (“[T]he
possibilities for changing police organizations are limited by structural features such as civil service and police unions.”).
284 Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 211.
285 Cf. Max Rivlin-Nadler, Police Union Turns Its Back on Cop Who Killed Innocent Man
in Brooklyn Stairwell, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 28, 2016, 11:17 AM), http://gothamist.com/2016/01/28/
akai_gurley_liang_trial.php (discussing surprising lack of PBA support at an officer’s trial).
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early 1900s.286 This group consisted of rank-and-file officers who met
with the Chief on a weekly basis to review police actions, including
uses of force.287 Officers who had used force were required to explain
their behaviors and the group would decide whether the force was
justified.288 The group also invited experts and members of the community, including those accused of criminal conduct, to address
them.289 “Advocates of community policing hold up the Friday Crab
Club as a paradigm for collegial peer review that will ‘unleash[ ] [the]
human potential that lies at the core of community policing and problem oriented policing.’”290
Another example occurred during the 1960s and 1970s when the
Oakland police department was struggling with violent encounters
with citizens.291 Chief Charles Gain was a reformist chief who had
strong support from the Black community, but not much from the
union.292 He pushed through many reforms despite union opposition.293 Many officers resigned or retired under his leadership and the
newly formed union issued a vote of no confidence.294 Despite his
strong leadership style, Chief Gain created the Violence Prevention
Unit with the help of social psychologist Hans Toch, to address the
problem of violence-prone officers.295 The Unit diverged from the otherwise hierarchical organization of the police department and Chief
Gain maintained a hands-off approach and allowed the Unit to function independently.296 The Unit was based on two assumptions: first,
that patrol officers could control other officers, and second, that those
officers who had been violent in the past would be in the best position
to help officers who were having problems in the present.297 The Unit
was successful in two ways—officers participated with great enthusiasm and caring, and the work of the panel reduced violent confrontaArmacost, supra note 200, at 541.
Id.
288 Id. at 542.
289 Id.
290 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting William A. Geller & Hans Toch, Understanding and
Controlling Police Abuse of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE, supra note 33, at 317).
291 See HANS TOCH & J. DOUGLAS GRANT, POLICE AS PROBLEM SOLVERS 77–85 (1991),
for an in-depth discussion.
292 See Jerome H. Skolnick, Enduring Issues of Police Culture and Demographics, in POLICE REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP, supra note 27, at 156, 161.
293 Id. at 162.
294 Id.
295 Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 207 (summarizing the findings of TOCH & GRANT,
supra note 291, at 77–85).
296 JIM ISENBERG, POLICE LEADERSHIP IN A DEMOCRACY 92 (2010).
297 Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 207.
286
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tions between the police and citizens.298 As with many such reforms,
however, it was discontinued due to department budget cuts.299 And
almost as soon as it was, police violence problems recurred.300
One more example is from Milwaukee in the 1960s and 1970s.
Despite the fact that the police chief, Harold Brier, had no interest in
improving relations with the Black community, the union saw things
differently.301 The union recognized that its members were on the
street as line officers and that they were the ones who suffered from
the antagonism from the Black community.302 So the union organized
meetings with citizen groups using community relations techniques
then in vogue.303 Like the Oakland experiment, however, the program
soon faded. In Milwaukee, unlike in Oakland, the Police Department
never formalized the program and never made funds available to reimburse officers for time spent with citizen groups.304 Although the
government’s Law Enforcement Administration Assistance
(“LEAA”) program used to give grants to police departments that
were interested in developing community relations programs, it excluded unions.305 In the years since, “LEAA has been replaced by several funding bureaus within the” DOJ, but these new bureaus still will
not fund union projects.306
The Metro-Dade Police-Citizen Violence Reduction Project is another example of rank-and-file officer involvement in police reform.
The Project involved a task force made up of officers, management,
and others who were tasked with reviewing a random sample of citizen complaints involving “police abuse, officers’ use of force,” and
officer injuries during police-citizen interactions.307 Based on the lessons they learned from this review, a new training program involving
role-plays was developed and implemented.308 The preliminary results
from the training program showed a thirty to fifty percent reduction
298

Id.

299

SKOLNICK & BAYLEY, supra note 283, at 151–52.

R

300

TOCH & GRANT, supra note 291, at 85 n.3.

R

301

Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 208.

R

302

Id.

303

Id.

304

Id.

305

Id.

306

Id.

James J. Fyfe, Training to Reduce Police-Civilian Violence, in POLICE VIOLENCE supra
note 33, at 165, 174.
307

308

Id.
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“in injuries to officers, officers’ use of force, and citizens’ complaints
of abuse.”309
Occasionally, police unions have formed alliances with civil rights
leaders or their organizations. In Los Angeles, the Police Protective
League (“PPL”) (“a notoriously inward-looking organization”) commissioned a report by law professor and civil liberties activist Erwin
Chemerinsky.310 They did so because the union’s members feared reprisals by the controversial new chief of police, Bernard Parks, whom
some League leaders believed would draw the wrong lessons from a
corruption scandal in the LAPD’s Rampart Division.311
In Newark, New Jersey, union president James Stewart helped
the DOJ during its investigation of the police department. According
to him, the “union’s attitude was ‘come on in,’” and it helped the DOJ
uncover problems within the police department, including “frequent
pedestrian stops that violated residents’ civil rights three out of every
four times they occurred.”312 Stewart even indicated that he “approves
of DOJ-mandated reforms related to the department’s officer training
and community relations.”313 Simultaneously, however, Stewart
strongly opposed any reforms that would create a civilian review
board.314 The union threatened to bring a lawsuit, arguing that
changes to officer discipline must be part of collective bargaining.315
In Los Angeles, the LAPD created a Community Safety Partnership unit that operates in some of the most dangerous and violent
housing developments.316 The officers in the unit patrol the neighborhoods on foot and know residents by name.317 They also earn the trust
Id.
SKLANSKY, supra note 119, at 183.
311 “Two years later, the PPL’s efforts to oust Parks triggered a decertification drive by
dissent officers supported by the Teamsters; in response the PPL joined the IUPA.” Id. “The
PPL had earlier supported Chemerinsky’s successful bid to serve on the Los Angeles Charter
Reform Commission.” Id. at 254 n.114.
312 Emmanuel, supra note 147.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Charlie Beck & Connie Rice, How Community Policing Can Work, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/opinion/how-community-policing-can-work.html.
See generally News Release, LAPD, LAPD’s Community Safety Partnership Program:
NR15021SF, L.A. POLICE DEP’T (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.lapdonline.org/newsroom/
news_view/57887; Constance Rice & Susan K. Lee, Advancement Project, Relationship-Based
Policing Achieving Safety in Watts, http://advancementprojectca.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2015/09/imce/President’s%20Task%20Force%20CSP%20Policy%20Brief%20FINAL%2002-2715.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
317 See Beck & Rice, supra note 316.
309
310
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of the community by providing social services to residents as well as
participating in neighborhood activities.318 Additionally, unlike the
ubiquitous practice of promoting officers based on the numbers of arrests they make, officers in this unit are rewarded for diverting people
from the criminal justice system and fostering positive relationships in
the community.319 While it is unclear how much the union was involved in these efforts, it did not file any grievances to stop the program or dissuade rank-and-file officers from participating in it.
Surprisingly, the experience in Seattle also provides an example
of how unions can work to facilitate reforms. In 2014, after some of
the events discussed in Section II.C, Ron Smith was elected as the new
President of SPOG. During his time in office from 2014 to 2016,
SPOG continued to vociferously defend and protect officers who were
accused of misconduct.320 However, Smith simultaneously worked
closely and collaboratively with the new Police Chief, Kathleen
O’Toole, and with reformers outside the department, to implement
DOJ-mandated reforms.321 The consent decree between the City and
the DOJ, which was in place for two years by the time Smith was
elected, required the adoption of extensive reforms to curb excessive
force and racially biased policing.322 In a move that was remarkable to
outside observers, Smith told his membership that bias-free policing
was important and if they did not like it, they could “leave and go to a
place that serves [their] worldview.”323 This is from the same union
that had, in 2010, “described efforts to combat racial profiling as ‘socialist policies’ from ‘the enemy’ and argued that officers should be
able to call citizens ‘bitch’ and ‘n***a.’”324

318

Id.

319

Id.

See, e.g., Ansel Herz, Seattle Police Union Says Contract Violation Prevents SPD from
Firing Officer Cynthia Whitlatch, STRANGER: SLOG (Sept. 3, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.thestran
ger.com/blogs/slog/2015/09/03/22808730/seattle-police-union-says-contract-violation-preventsspd-from-firing-officer-cynthia-whitlatch.
320

321 See Steve Miletich, Seattle Police Union President Says He Quit Over Facebook Post
Before His Board Tried to Fire Him, SEATTLE TIMES (July 14, 2016, 12:12 AM), http://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattle-police-guild-president-says-he-quit-before-hisboard-tried-to-fire-him/.
322

See id.

Ansel Herz, Seattle Police Union President to Cops: Get with the Times or Get Out of
This City, STRANGER: SLOG (Feb. 18, 2015, 4:05 PM), http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/
2015/02/18/21739167/seattle-police-union-president-to-cops-get-with-the-times-or-get-out-ofthis-city (emphasis removed).
323

324

Id.; see also Holden, supra note 270.
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Negotiations on the collective bargaining agreement between
SPOG and the City began in 2015.325 These negotiations had to be
completed before reforms under the consent decree could continue
because some of the measures to improve police accountability potentially conflicted with the current contract.326 During the negotiations,
SPOG President Smith was supportive of adopting some accountability measures that would lead to more transparency. For instance, he
supported changes to the collective bargaining agreement that would
have opened disciplinary hearings to certain outsiders, including a citizen observer appointed by the mayor and members of the Community
Police Commission (“CPC”).327 The CPC is a group created by the
DOJ consent decree328 made up primarily of community groups, including the ACLU and the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (“NAACP”), that had asked the DOJ to investigate the SPD.329 The CPC also has a guaranteed spot for a representative from SPOG and from the Seattle Police Management
Association.330
Under Smith’s leadership, SPOG did not file any grievances or do
anything else to block any of the reform efforts.331 One of the cochairs of the CPC, Lisa Daugaard, noted that during the reform process, “things could have gone terribly with SPOG, but [didn’t].”332 She
continued:
To the surprise of many including me, . . . SPOG really has
not impeded the reform process. There were many points
Herz, supra note 269.
See id.
327 Ansel Herz, Inside the City’s Negotiations with the Police Union, STRANGER (June 22,
2016), http://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/06/22/24243759/inside-the-citys-negotiations-withthe-police-union/; see also Miletich, supra note 321.
328 Steve Miletich & Mike Carter, SPD Faces New Oversight, Scrutiny of Use of Force,
SEATTLE TIMES (July 28, 2012, 12:16 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/spd-facesnew-oversight-scrutiny-of-use-of-force/. The purpose of the group is to review the semiannual
reports completed by the court appointed monitor, “hold public meetings, make recommendations to the city, and engage the community in police reforms. It also will review recommended
changes to the department’s civilian-run Office of Professional Accountability, among other
tasks.” Id.; see also Community Police Commission: About Us, SEATTLE.GOV, http://
www.seattle.gov/community-police-commission/about-us (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (providing
more information about the Community Police Commission).
329 See David Kroman, Reformers Aren’t Celebrating Police Union Leader’s Resignation,
CROSSCUT (July 14, 2016), http://crosscut.com/2016/07/ron-smith-seattle-police-cpc/.
330 David Kroman, Police Unions, Citizen Group Forge Unlikely Partnership, CROSSCUT
(Feb. 9, 2016), http://crosscut.com/2016/02/police-citizen-group-forge-unlikely-partnership/.
331 Interview with Lisa Daugaard, Co-Chair of the CPC and Director of the Public Defenders Association (July 14, 2016).
332 Kroman, supra note 329.
325

R

326
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along the way when many police unions might have filed
grievances or unfair labor practice complaints about the
changes that have been implemented without bargaining.
They’ve chosen not to do that.333
She concluded, “It’s not as simple as the labor union being the
problem, tempting as that idea is, and true as it may have been in the
past.”334 And when, in 2014, rank-and-file officers from the North Precinct attempted to derail the new use of force policy adopted by the
police department by filing a lawsuit, SPOG President Smith publically voiced his disapproval and the union did not join the lawsuit.335
The relationship between the CPC and the police union has been
described as “among the healthiest between any two parties in the
[reform] process.”336 Smith notes that the CPC treats the SPOG representative with respect and stated that while SPOG and the CPC do
not agree on everything, at least they “can talk to each other.”337 He
further shared that he has “a really good relationship with [CPC cochair] Lisa [Daugaard].”338 The relationship is such that when the federal district court judge in charge of overseeing the consent decree
suggested that “any new appeal process for police discipline cases created through ongoing collective bargaining negotiations must get approval from the court,” the CPC filed an amicus brief supporting
SPOG’s resistance to this suggestion.339 Ironically, observers note that
most of the tension “has been between the CPC and other parties to
the consent decree, namely the Mayor’s Office and the independent
monitor team.”340
Unfortunately, the rosy situation in Seattle may have come to an
end. In early June 2016, SPOG President Ron Smith resigned after a
scandal involving a controversial Facebook post in which he blamed
the Dallas police officer shootings on what he termed the “minority
movement.”341 He denies that he was referring to the Black Lives
Id.
Id.
335 Steve Miletich, SPD Officers Say City ‘Playing Politics’ with Their Lives, SEATTLE
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014, 8:15 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/spd-officers-say-citylsquoplaying-politicsrsquo-with-their-lives/.
336 Kroman, supra note 330.
337 Id.
338 Id. (alteration in original).
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Miletich, supra note 321. Over a year earlier, in the December 2014 edition of the union
newsletter, Smith accused Barack Obama, Eric Holder, and Reverend Al Sharpton of carrying
out a “divisive political agenda” in response to Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson. See Ansel
333
334
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Matter movement, claiming instead that he was referring to “the small
segment of society which has the propensity for violence toward law
enforcement.”342 However, he resigned because the negative publicity
was pulling attention away from the reform efforts being made in the
City.343
In a later interview, however, Smith disclosed that he also resigned because the Executive Board of the union was going to attempt
to force him out because of his acceptance of police accountability
measures in the proposed union contract and for being too conciliatory to outside reformers and the Police Chief.344 He had been described as a “bootlicker” because of his relationship with the Chief,
despite the fact that his collaboration with Chief O’Toole was crucial
to his ability to negotiate improvements to officer working conditions.345 While he expected that he could win the fight and stay in office because of support he had amongst some members of the
Executive Board and the rank-and-file, he did not want the controversy over his Facebook post to distract from the ongoing reform process.346 After he resigned, officers voted 823 to 156 to reject the
contract.347 One of the reasons was the inclusion of civilian review in
the proposed agreement.348

Herz, SPOG is Still an Obstacle to Reform at the Seattle Police Department, STRANGER: SLOG
(Dec. 22, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2014/12/22/spog-is-still-an-ob
stacle-to-reform-at-the-seattle-police-department (emphasis removed).
342 Ansel Herz, Seattle Police Guild President Resigns After Offensive Facebook Post,
STRANGER, SLOG (July 12, 2016, 9:51 PM), http://www.thestranger.com/slog/2016/07/12/
24337587/seattle-police-guild-president-resigns.
343

Id.

344

Miletich, supra note 321.

Jennifer Sullivan, ‘Mellowed’ Leader at Helm of SPD Union Reflects on First Year, SETIMES (Apr. 16, 2015, 6:28 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/mellowedleader-at-helm-of-spd-union-reflects-on-first-year/. Smith praised the Chief for being the first in
recent history to work closely with the union. Id. Under past chiefs, he stated, the union had to
file grievances and unfair labor practices claims. Id.
345

ATTLE

346

Id.

Seattle Police Union Overwhelmingly Rejects Contract Offer, Q13 FOX (July 21, 2016,
3:52 PM), http://q13fox.com/2016/07/21/seattle-police-officers-union-spog-overwhelmingly-re
jects-contract-offer/.
347

348 Id. (“An email from the Seattle Police Guild (SPOG) said officers voted 823–156 to
reject the proposal. A source told Q13 News that among the sticking points, two loomed large.
The first was that officers oppose involuntary transfers for non-disciplinary reasons. The second
was that officers don’t want civilian investigators in the Office of Professional Accountability,
preferring instead that complaints be handled by sworn officers.”).
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B. Drawing Lessons from Experiences
One of the most important lessons from the examples above is
that while it might be difficult to convince unions to move away from
their core mission to protect their membership from discipline, their
defense of officers does not necessarily signal a lack of willingness to
engage in other reform efforts. Although reformers often view a
union’s defense of officers as a hindrance, sometimes this defense can
even facilitate reforms by exposing institutional and systemic
problems. For instance, as discussed in Part I, broken windows policing, the War on Drugs, and CompStat have together created intense
pressures on rank-and-file officers to increase summonses, arrests, and
stops and frisks. When officers complain or fail to meet their numbers,
they might be given negative performance evaluations, affecting their
ability to get promoted.
This occurred in 2012 when some NYPD officers believed that
their negative performance evaluations were the result of their complaints about their precinct’s quota system.349 Patrick Lynch, the President of the NYPD’s police union, the PBA, brought attention to these
problems when he told newspaper reporters that these quotas were “a
department-wide problem.”350 A New York Times Magazine article on
the persistence of arrest quotas reported that officers who shared their
belief that the emphasis on numbers resulted in unnecessary arrests
feared retribution from the brass. One officer said that the rank-andfile were “utterly demoralized and critical of the department. But they
don’t have a voice . . . . If they speak out, they get crushed.”351
In 2005, the PBA challenged “the department’s obsession with
numbers” in a case involving an officer employed by the seventy-fifth
precinct who received a negative evaluation allegedly based on his
failure to meet the unofficial quota.352 Years later, on May 7, 2012, the
PBA took out a newspaper ad attacking the quotas which read:
“Don’t blame the cop . . . . Blame NYPD management for pressure to
write summonses and the pressure to convict motorists.”353 The ad
claimed the Department punished officers who did not write enough
tickets.354 Similarly, in New Jersey, the union opposed orders from poGRAHAM A. RAYMAN, THE NYPD TAPES 233 (2013).
Id.
351 Knafo, supra note 106. Interestingly, however, the article never mentioned the NYPD
police union as a source of protection for officers seeking to challenge harassment of minority
communities; officers instead turned to a civil rights suit against the NYPD. Id.
352 RAYMAN, supra note 349, at 43.
353 Id. at 234.
354 Id.
349
350
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lice management to meet quotas, which union president Stewart
claims created pressure on officers “to conduct baseless stops and
strained relations with community members.”355
Additionally, a union’s defense of officers can also facilitate
structural reforms. For instance, NYPD officers who spoke out against
the Department’s controversial stop and frisk practices did so anonymously because they feared retaliation and punishment.356 One officer
said that “punishments for falling short of quotas ranged from losing a
longtime partner, low evaluation scores, retraining and denial of days
off or overtime requests.”357 Other officers shared similar stories.358
Although it is unclear whether the union played any role in protecting
these officers’ right to speak out against prevailing management practices, doing so would certainly fall within the union’s function.
Another lesson from the examples is the importance of giving
voice to rank-and-file officers in reform efforts. However, much of the
policing literature observes that most reform efforts take a top-down
approach. Police chiefs, politicians, and reformers often complain that
the union and the collective bargaining agreement are obstacles to reform, and many police reformers have long accepted the idea that reform can only be accomplished through a top-down process.359
The wariness of some reformers about the willingness of police
unions to embrace reform can be traced to the political activism of
355

Emmanuel, supra note 147.

R

E.g., The Nation, The Hunted and the Hated: An Inside Look at the NYPD’s Stop-andFrisk Policy, YOUTUBE 1:10 (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rWtDMPaRD8.
356

357 Ryan Devereaux, ‘We Were Handcuffing Kids for No Reason’: Stop-and-Frisk Goes on
Trial, NATION (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/we-were-handcuffing-kids-noreason-stop-and-frisk-goes-trial/.
358 Id. (“[A]nother Bronx police officer, Pedro Serrano . . . testified that failing to meet the
precinct’s quotas translated in low evaluation marks. From 2010 to 2011, his scores dropped in
every evaluation category. In 2012, he recorded more arrests and summonses, he testified, but
his evaluations stayed the same because he performed only two stop-and-frisks for the entire
year.”).
359 See Skogan, supra note 42, at 149 (describing union resistance to community policing
efforts); Wesley G. Skogan, Community Policing: Common Impediments to Success, in COMMUNITY POLICING 159, 164 (Lorie Fridell & Mary Ann Wycoff eds., 2004) (noting that “[i]n a West
Coast city, the union protested strongly against the community policing program (giving it the
familiar ‘social work’ label) and threatened to keep officers from appearing at training at all”);
Walker, supra note 28, at 92; see also SKLANSKY, supra note 119, at 156 (“The dominant mind-set
of police departments, police reformers, appellate judges, and criminal justice scholars—the
dominant mind-set, in short, of nearly everyone who thinks about policing and its problems—is,
and has long been, that policing is a place for top-down management. Good police officers are
police officers who follow rules. Police unions, and police organizing more generally, are obstacles, not opportunities.”).
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unions during the late 1960s,360 when unions opposed citizen review
boards and reform-oriented chiefs,361 in addition to pursuing improvements in wages, benefits, and seniority.362 Police activism during this
time often took the form of “rabid, knee-jerk opposition to civilian
oversight, active participation in far right-wing organizations, vigilante
attacks on black activists, [and] organized brutality against political
protesters.”363 Today, statements and actions by police unions and
rank-and-file officers continue to lend support to the view that police
rank-and-file share a monolithic occupational mindset and subculture
of paranoia, insularity, and intolerance.364
It is also undoubtedly true that the crime-fighting ideology of
professionalism in policing and the law-and-order rhetoric of the political right had a long-term impact on police officers and their unions,
even though most police union leaders now are in the middle of the
political spectrum.365 Additionally, some resistance to reforms can be
explained by rank-and-file opposition to policies that require them to
retreat from their traditional, aggressive crime-control orientation.
This should not be surprising, however, because many likely joined
the police department relying upon the type of policing that is cur360 SKLANSKY, supra note 119, at 55 (“Skolnick . . . saw police activism as a threat to the
rule of law: like judges or soldiers, police officers should be apolitical.”) (citing JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 286–88 (1966)).
361 See id. at 55 (citing STEPHEN C. HALPERN, POLICE-ASSOCIATION AND DEPARTMENT
LEADERS 11–88 (1974)); see also SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 27–29 (2001);
SKOLNICK, supra note 360, at 278–81. For instance, “the 1971 vote of no confidence in Chief
Charles Gain of the Oakland Police Department by the local Police Officers’ Association. Gain
was a committed reformer who won the respect not only of Skolnick but also other scholars who
used the Oakland department for sociological research on the police.” SKLANSKY, supra note
119, at 217 n.144.
362 SKLANSKY, supra note 119, at 55.
363 Sklansky, supra note 40, at 1241; see, e.g., Paoline, supra note 52, at 200 (“[M]any have
asserted that the major barrier to reforming the police is the [police] culture.”); Skogan, supra
note 42, at 148–49 (describing union resistance to community policing efforts in Chicago);
Walker, supra note 28, at 95 (“Anecdotally, police chiefs routinely complain that they are unable to undertake certain innovations because of the police union and the collective bargaining
agreement.”).
364 Sklansky, supra note 80, at 20; see Manning, supra note 41, at 59 (noting that discussions
of the rank-and-file “have been conflated into a caricature”); Paoline, supra note 52, at 200
(“Most connotations of police culture are negative.”); REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (1994), reprinted in 6 NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS, 1894–1994, 1, 107 (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1997) (discussing
the culture of corruption within the organization); REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT ix–xii (1991) (documenting a similar culture of
corruption).
365 See Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 204.
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rently in vogue and taught in most police academies and in their departments. Thus, changes to policing tactics might seem like a baitand-switch, especially when measures of officer success have not kept
pace with changes in policing tactics such as community policing.
However, attributing resistance solely to rank-and-file intransigence ignores how the typical top-down approach to reforms can also
predictably lead to resistance. Resistance often stems from people’s
“opposition to, or frustration with, enactments of power.”366 Research
from the study of power reveals that certain exercises of authority can
breed deep resentment among lower-level employees, resulting in resistance to employer-mandated policies and procedures. One form of
power that predictably produces frustration is failing to provide employees with a voice in decisionmaking.367 Voice is important because
it expresses to workers that their views are significant enough to be
considered.368 Failing to give employees’ voice, or providing them with
illusory voice,369 not only serves as a sign of their low status, but also
deprives them of interactions with power holders that can favorably
influence their attitudes.370
These studies of the significance of voice in the workplace correspond to studies of police culture and suggest the importance of police
union involvement in police reform. Studies of the successes and failures of community policing models have found that proper training of
officers and a participatory management style are correlated with
more positive officer attitudes about community policing.371 For
instance:
Street officers in Chicago who feel well trained in COP
[community-oriented policing] hold much more positive attitudes about their jobs than officers who do not feel well
366 Thomas B. Lawrence & Sandra L. Robinson, Ain’t Misbehavin: Workplace Deviance as
Organizational Resistance, 33 J. MGMT. 378, 380 (2007); see also Mitch Rose, The Seduction of
Resistance: Power, Politics, and a Performative Style of Systems, 20 ENV’T & PLAN. D 383, 387
(2002) (noting that “practices of ‘resistance cannot be separated from practices of domination:
they are always entangled in some configuration’ ”).
367 See David I. Levine, How Business and Employees Can Both Win: Advantages and Disadvantages of Employee Involvement, U.C. BERKLEY: COHRE (Jan. 27, 1999), http://
www.irle.berkeley.edu/cohre/levine/adv.html.
368 E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 952 (1990).
369 See id. at 953 (“[P]eople react quite negatively to ostensibly high voice procedures when
repeated unfavorable outcomes or communications from others focus attention on possible biases that might subvert the impact of their voice.”).
370 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 176 (2006).
371 Richard E. Adams et al., Implementing Community-Oriented Policing: Organizational
Change and Street Officer Attitudes, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 399, 403–04, 421 (2002).
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trained; they are also more optimistic about the impact of
COP on crime if they feel a part of the decision-making process. Agencies that imposed community policing and maintained a top-down, paramilitary decision-making style
tended to meet with strong officer resistance.372
Moreover, it is likely that the insights and creativity of rank-andfile officers can revolutionize policing. “[L]ine personnel are a powerful and important resource . . . to improve policing [and] the relationship between police and citizens.”373 Another example from Seattle
demonstrates this point. In October of 2011, Seattle unveiled an ambitious and unique four-year pilot program to address the major problem of open-air drug markets in the downtown Seattle corridor.374 The
Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (“LEAD”) program is a prebooking program that gives police officers the discretion to divert individuals engaged in low-level drug and prostitution crimes to community-based services instead of jail and prosecution.375 The program was
the first of its kind in the country and resulted from a successful collaboration between unlikely partners including the public defender’s
office, the prosecutor’s office, community groups, nonprofit organizations such as the ACLU, and top command from the SPD.376
Like many other reform efforts that seek to change street-level
policing practices, LEAD policymakers followed a top-down approach. They sought input from high-level police officials, social scientists, advocates, and community leaders.377 Although patrol officers
from one precinct of the SPD were given significant responsibility for
372

Id. at 404 (citations omitted).

373

Kelling & Kliesmet, supra note 33, at 210.

R

KATHERINE BECKETT, SEATTLE’S LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION PROGRAM
4 (2014), http://leadkingcounty.org/lead-evaluation/ (follow “View previous 2014-LEAD Process
Evaluation” hyperlink).
374

375 Dan Satterberg, a King County prosecutor, stated that officers will continue to patrol
open air drug markets, “but they will now have . . . a compassionate option and a hopeful option
for people who have lost their way.” Millionair Club Charity, Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) Program News Conference 10/13/2001, YOUTUBE 2:04 (Dec. 9, 2011), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=fls4B4V5-1U; see also KingCountyTV, Prosecutor’s Partners - Evergreen Treatment Services, YOUTUBE 4:17 (July 22, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rxo8qPgQq_M (“The officer gives that person a choice. Do you want to go to jail or do
you want to go to LEAD?”).
376 See LFA GROUP, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION (LEAD) PROGRAM AND
EVALUATION PLAN NARRATIVE (2011), http://leadwa.squarespace.com/storage/LFA%20Evalu
ation%20Narrative%20-%20February%202012.pdf.

Cf. Mark Bevir & Ben Krupicka, Police Reform, Governance, and Democracy, in POOCCUPATIONAL CULTURE, supra note 41, at 153, 173 (discussing top-down approach).

377
LICE
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making the program work, their input was never sought.378 Rather, the
reformers used the ubiquitous top-down approach and worked only
with top command in developing the policy.379
The new program was poised to be a huge success.380 Commandlevel officers within the police department fully supported the program.381 As a result, they instituted new rules and policies for patrol
officers to follow.382 There was just one problem. Despite the absence
of overt resistance to the program from the rank-and-file officers responsible for its implementation, there was significant opposition behind the scenes.383 In fact, not only did patrol officers resent the
program, but middle managers within the department were also suspicious.384 The unique and groundbreaking cooperation between top
command and outside agencies and experts may have aggravated
rank-and-file resentments. As two policing scholars note, rank-andfile officers do “not appreciate being told what to do by outsiders,
especially outsiders whom they perceive as unacquainted, or at least
out of touch, with the daily demands of their job.”385 Consequently,
while these officers did not publicly voice their disapproval of LEAD,
some quietly and covertly failed to implement it.386 This hidden resistance would not have been discovered but for the fact that the program’s evaluation process included focus groups with middle
management.387
It is unsurprising that the rank-and-file were suspicious of the
policy. Although top command was heavily involved in working out its
See Sara Jean Green, LEAD Program for Low-Level Drug Criminals Sees Success, SETIMES (Apr. 9, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/lead-pro
gram-for-low-level-drug-criminals-sees-success/; Interview with Lisa Daugaard, supra note 331.
378

ATTLE

R

See Toch, supra note 54, at 66; see also Bevir & Krupicka, supra note 377, at 173 (“The
top-down view of the policy process held by many reformers means that local police departments
and rank and file officers are often only cursorily consulted about reform programs.”); Walker,
supra note 28, at 103 (“One aspect of the neglect of police unions has been the failure of accountability advocates to involve union leaders in discussions of reform measures.”).

R

380 See Green, supra note 378 (quoting an author of a LEAD evaluation saying that the
program “looks very promising”).

R

379

381

See BECKETT, supra note 374, at 21.

382

Id.

383

Id.

R

R

Interview with Lisa Daugaard, supra note 331; see also BECKETT, supra note 374, at
21–27; Skogan, supra note 42, at 145.

R
R

385 See Bevir & Krupicka, supra note 377, at 173; see also Skogan, supra note 42, at 147
(“Police are skeptical about programs invented by civilians.”).

R

384

386

See BECKETT, supra note 374, at 25.

387

See generally id.
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final details, this was unlikely to alleviate rank-and-file concerns.388
Furthermore, failing to give them any voice likely fueled existing resentments because it communicated to them just how unimportant
their views were and just how low their status was within the department. To make matters worse, they were one of the only groups excluded from policymaking that would actually be affected by the
policy. Members of the community and other organizations throughout the City gave their input.389 Finally, because the rank-and-file had
no contact with the civilian reformers, they had no opportunity to develop a different opinion about their motives.390
Rank-and-file resistance to LEAD was not open and obvious.
There was no public position taken by the union against the policy and
the officers did not publicly voice their disapproval. Rather, they engaged in what political scientist James Scott refers to as “everyday resistance”: acts of resistance that are meant to frustrate or defeat
formal dictates in ways that are designed not to be discernible.391 Their
resistance was only discovered because LEAD’s evaluation process
called for the creation of focus groups made up of sergeants from the
department.392 During discussions, the sergeants not only disclosed
their own reservations about the policy, but they also shared the resentments of the rank-and-file.393 These resentments and mistrust had
led the rank-and-file to quietly and covertly undermine the policy on
the street.394
In response, the group began to work closely with the sergeants
and some rank-and-file officers to determine what the problems were
388 Id. at 2 (“One of the most significant challenges for LEAD stakeholders in Seattle has
been eliciting officer buy-in despite strong support from police leadership for LEAD.”).
389 See id. at 5; Innovative LEAD Project Sends Drug Offenders to Services Instead of Jail,
ACLU OF WASHINGTON (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.aclu-wa.org/news/innovative-lead-projectsends-drug-offenders-services-instead-jail (noting that LEAD’s Policy Coordinating group includes “representatives from the Seattle Office of the Mayor; King County Executive Office;
Seattle City Council; King County Council; Seattle City Attorney’s Office; King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office; Seattle Police Department; King County Sheriff’s Office; Washington
State Department of Corrections; Belltown LEAD Community Advisory Board; Skyway LEAD
Community Advisory Board; The Defender Association; and the ACLU of Washington”).
390 Additionally, they had no opportunity to voice their valid concerns such as whether
their new responsibilities would simply be added on to their existing duties, whether they would
be given credit for referring people to treatment, and whether these new responsibilities would
require more paperwork without any decrease in their existing duties.
391 SCOTT, supra note 77, at 190, 195, 198.
392 BECKETT, supra note 374, at 22–26.
393 Interview with Lisa Daugaard, Director of the Public Defenders Association (Nov. 18,
2011).
394 Id.; see also BECKETT, supra note 374, at 25.
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and how to best address them.395 This process entailed giving these
groups a voice and the ability to make changes to LEAD in response
to their concerns. While the officers were initially skeptical about
whether the group was actually interested in obtaining their input,
they slowly came around.396
Today, not only has the program improved,397 but the relationships of trust that were formed between members of the police department and reformers have fostered additional gains in other areas.
Importantly, it is not that all rank-and-file officers bought into the
program, but, rather, that while some still questioned the substance of
the policy, they also worked towards improving its efficacy.398 Giving
genuine voice to officers and treating them with respect affected their
attitudes and behaviors towards LEAD.399 This occurred even though
many continue to disagree with the substance of the policy.400 Being
included in the process, rather than being marginalized, and having
quality interpersonal interactions with reformers helped mitigate feelings of distrust and skepticism from the lower ranks.401 According to
one of the reformers who founded LEAD, the program is having an
important and positive impact in the community due to innovations
from rank-and-file police officers and sergeants.402
In sum, the Seattle experience provides some evidence that rankand-file officers can play a significant role in reform-oriented policymaking. Although this role did not involve the union per se, the
union also did not file grievances and other collective bargaining challenges that they could have brought. Furthermore, the relationships of
trust that developed between some members of the rank-and-file and
the outside reformers have facilitated other reform efforts. With this
type of close contact, reformers can gain a better understanding of the
major concerns of the rank-and-file and the union and attempt to address them.
395

See BECKETT, supra note 374, at 22.

R

See id. at 23 (“In these groups, too, officers noted that some of their critiques and suggestions had resulted in concrete changes to the protocol. For example, [one] sergeant commented that the fact that officers got ‘a say’ in how the program would work enhanced police
cooperation . . . .”); see also id. at 36, 42.
396

397

Green, supra note 378 (discussing study which shows success of the program).

R

398

See BECKETT, supra note 374, at 26–27.

R

399

Id. at 23.

400

Id. at 26.

401

Id. at 27–28.

402

Id. at 43.
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Giving the rank-and-file a voice in implementing reforms can also
facilitate more positive relationships between the rank-and-file and
police management. The more contact management has with the rankand-file, the less likely union leadership can successfully paint a falsely
negative picture of management to ensure that rank-and-file officers
continue to join the union, increasing the power, influence, and
budget of union leadership.
Policymakers cannot afford to disregard the dynamics of power
within police departments for at least two reasons. First, the way that
power is exercised within departments can influence whether rankand-file officers view reforms as legitimate and entitled to deference,
or whether they attempt to undermine them through acts of resistance. Policymakers should recognize that when they work solely with
the top command levels of police departments, they might unintentionally exacerbate rank-and-file frustrations with existing power arrangements, leading to resistance to any new policies that might be
enacted.403 Thus, although reformers may believe they have achieved
success because police management has enacted new policies and procedures in response to their concerns, their failure to engage the rankand-file may ultimately doom their efforts.
Second, the dynamics of power also reveal that resistance may
occur without the knowledge of police management or outside policymakers. Hidden acts of resistance in the face of power are ubiquitous
because open opposition by subordinate groups often has adverse
consequences, especially in the workplace.404 For instance, an employee who candidly expresses her displeasure and disagreement with
rules and policies directly to her supervisor may significantly reduce
her opportunities for promotion or other discretionary employment
benefits. Because street officers operate primarily out of sight of management, they have numerous opportunities to engage in covert resistance to reform-oriented policies. When resistance is subtle rather
than overt, management and reformers may be unaware that the new
policy is not being implemented.405
What the analysis thus far has shown is that police unions have
strong incentives to resist policies imposed without their involvement
in policy development, but also that when they are involved in policy
development and when the reforms are not simply focused on harsher
and swifter punishment of officers, police unions have supported
403
404
405

Id. at 26.
See SCOTT, supra note 77, at 155.
See BECKETT, supra note 374, at 21–26.
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them. The question to which this Article now turn is whether it is feasible to use the levers of labor law to increase the incentives for departments and unions to collaborate in developing and implementing
reforms.
IV. CHANGING POLICE UNIONS
One would search in vain for any account of the problems with
policing or the avenues for reform that doesn’t place substantial emphasis on changing rank-and-file police culture and the supervision
and training of the rank-and-file. As the DOJ concluded in its August
2016 Report on the Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”), “[t]he
constitutional violations described in [the] findings result in part from
critical deficiencies in the BPD’s systems to train, equip, supervise,
and hold officers accountable.”406 DOJ found that, among other
things, the BPD does not “collect and analyze reliable data” to allow
early interventions to deal with problematic officer conduct; does not
consistently accept, investigate, or respond to complaints of even serious misconduct; and “many officers are reluctant to report misconduct
for fear that doing so is fruitless and may provoke retaliation.”407 The
set of best practices promulgated by the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, along with empirical research on police, agree that
rank-and-file officers should be involved in the development of policies, and in-depth analyses of problematic police departments often
find that the rank-and-file are not involved in policymaking and resist
the implementation of reforms.408 Although scholars and commentators urge greater public involvement and transparency, more will be
required than just public involvement and transparency to get police
culture to change.409 The question this Article answers is whether
DOJ BALT. REP., supra note 13, at 128.
Id. The DOJ made similar findings in the recent DOJ Chicago Report. See DOJ CHI.
REP., supra note 10, at 110, 124.
408 See W. Dwayne Orrick, Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Best Practices Guide: Developing a Police Department Policy-Procedure Manual 2–3, http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/docu
ments/pdfs/BP-PolicyProcedures.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2017); see, e.g., Nicole E. Haas et al.,
Explaining Officer Compliance: The Importance of Procedural Justice and Trust Inside a Police
Organization, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 442, 445, 457 (2015); see also DOJ BALT. REP.,
supra note 13, at 129–30 (finding that BPD does not seek officer input into policy development
with the result that officers find policies to be “confusing and opaque” and “lack . . . confidence
in the policy guidance BPD provides”).
409 The recent proposal by Professor Rushin proposes greater public involvement as the
major policy reform to address police misconduct. See generally Rushin, supra note 20. Past
experiments with increased public oversight alone suggest that this reform is likely to encounter
substantial resistance from rank-and-file insufficient to transform police practices absent dramatic changes in management that will generate trust of the rank-and-file. What is needed are
406

R

407
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changing certain institutional structures of employee representation,
including police unions, will promote rank-and-file support for measures that would improve community policing, transparency, and accountability. In short: yes.
Principles of labor law should be used to create leverage within
police departments for officers and supervisors who support reform.
In particular, organizations of officers other than the majority union
should be empowered to meet and confer with department leaders
over the formulation and implementation of policies relating to community policing, data collection and analysis, and transparency. Section A outlines the appropriate incursions on the labor law principle
of exclusive representation. Section B then addresses the specifics of
the proposal. This Part concludes by addressing some potential
questions.
A. Why Empower New Labor Organizations in Police
Departments?
The literature on policing, the investigations of particular police
departments, and the news coverage of policing since Ferguson suggest that officers throughout the hierarchy in many police departments are receptive to reform and willing to report and to try to
prevent unconstitutional conduct.410 But most accounts of supporters
of reform either make no mention of the police union or suggest that
the union was at best indifferent to the problems and at worst hostile
to reform efforts and whistleblowers.411 For example, the NYPD officer profiled in the February 2016 New York Times Magazine for his
efforts to challenge the persistence of racial inequities in police-citizen
encounters described being retaliated against and seeking support not
from the police union but from an association of Black NYPD officers
and joining a class action suit.412 Another NYPD officer, Adrian
Schoolcraft, was retaliated against by management when he exposed
the crime data manipulation occurring due to the Department’s unofficial quota policy, and the PBA did nothing to protect him.413 In the
reforms that garner rank-and-file support so that the practices are embraced willingly rather
than imposed through threat of discipline and public exposure. The reforms proposed here
should be considered in addition to public involvement, not in lieu of it.
410 See supra Section III.A.
411 See supra Part II.
412 Knafo, supra note 106.
413 See Len Levitt, Adrian Schoolcraft: Now It’s Getting Serious, HUFFINGTON POST (MAY
25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/len-levitt/adrian-schoolcraft-now-it_b_816281.html;
Graham Rayman, Adrian Schoolcraft, NYPD Whistleblower, Gets Law and Order: SVU Treat-
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LAPD, an association of Black officers supports Black Lives Matter
while the union does not.414 The DOJ report on the BPD states that
investigators met with leadership of the Baltimore City Lodge No. 3
of the FOP, which represents all sworn BPD officers, and repeatedly
cites a 2012 FOP report critical of certain aspects of BPD. The DOJ
report notes a few provisions of the union contract that make officer
discipline more difficult but says relatively little about how the FOP
could be either an obstacle to or an agent of reform.415 The DOJ report on the Chicago Police Department states its investigators met
with representatives of the unions for rank-and-file, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains, and the report notes that although there are obstacles to accountability in the union contracts, there are also ways to
override these contractual impediments that the City rarely invokes.416
If the reformers at the top of a police department had institutionalized
connections to reform supporters at the bottom of the hierarchy,
things might change.
In theory, unions could facilitate accountability. By protecting
rank-and-file officers from unfair decisions, unions could enable these
officers to exercise discretion and judgment, assure fairness in punishing mistakes, and enable whistleblowing. Unions might prevent
scapegoating a single hapless officer when blame for mistreatment of
citizens belongs elsewhere. They could also work to counter management’s insistence on dangerous policies, such as the case of NYPD
Officer Peter Liang, who shot an unarmed Black youth in a stairwell
while on duty in accordance with a policy of “training” rookie officers
by placing them in extremely dangerous situations, which had previously been identified by Commissioner Bratton “as a ticking time
bomb.”417 Yet the examples above and in Part II suggest that unions
do not always play this role.
Changing demographics of large urban police forces may provide
a path forward to create such institutionalized connections among reformers throughout the hierarchy. As police departments have bement, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 17, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/adrianschoolcraft-nypd-whistleblower-gets-law-and-order-svu-treatment-6687138; Graham Rayman,
NYPD Tapes 4: The WhistleBlower, Adrian Schoolcraft, VILLAGE VOICE (June 15, 2010, 4:00
AM), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/nypd-tapes-4-the-whistleblower-adrian-schoolcraft6429143.
414 See Abcarian, supra note 64.
415 DOJ BALT. REP., supra note 13, at 4, 17, 131–33, 151.
416 DOJ CHI. REP., supra note 10, at 46–47.
417 See Murray Weiss, NYPD Phases Out Programs that Pair Rookie Officers to Fight
Crime, DNAINFO: ON THE INSIDE (Feb. 12, 2016, 4:08 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/
20160212/civic-center/nypd-phases-out-programs-that-pair-rookie-officers-fight-crime.
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come more diverse, identity-based groups representing officers have
gained members and influence. Recent work shows that “[a] diverse
police force mitigates group threat and thereby reduces the number of
officer-involved killings.”418 The diversity of the police force is thought
to reduce excessive force through four processes: (1) it increases legitimacy of the police among minority communities; (2) it increases the
number of officers who may be more compassionate toward minority
communities; (3) it increases opportunities for contact between police
and citizens; and, perhaps most important, (4) it weakens solidarity
within the police community when confronted with threats.419 Thus,
although data remain unclear on whether the representation of African Americans in the police directly influences the number of officerinvolved killings of African Americans, it is linked with “various factors associated with group threat and thereby eases the tensions between the police and African-American communities.”420
A diverse workforce is less likely to have a monolithic attitude
toward issues, but it is necessary to have a mechanism to translate the
diversity of perspectives into policymaking and implementation. That
institutional mechanism could be a diversity of labor organizations.
Such organizations already exist in many large departments. The next
step is to make them more effective in becoming a voice for reform.
That process may already be happening, as some mainstream police
unions are staving off the threat to their dominance as the police labor
representative by building their own bridges to civilian groups, both
inside and outside the labor movement.421
A second and related way the institutionalization of alternative
labor organizations might transform police departments is by combatting the proven tendency of police unions toward oligarchy. The solidarity that is essential for any union to function is especially powerful
in a workforce in which officers can endanger each other’s safety by
refusing to respond to a call for backup. The duty of fair representation, along with union constitutions and bylaws requiring regular dem418 Joscha Legewie & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer Diversity and the Deadly
Use of Police Force 30 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 14-512, 2016).
419 Id. at 7–9; see SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE 180 (5th ed. 2012);
Brad W. Smith, The Impact of Police Officer Diversity on Police-Caused Homicides, 31 POL’Y
STUD. J. 147, 150 (2003).
420 Legewie & Fagan, supra note 418, at 32–33.
421 See WALKER ET AL., supra note 419, at 180; Sklansky, supra note 80, at 21. See generally
Ivan Y. Sun & Brian K. Payne, Racial Differences in Resolving Conflicts: A Comparison Between
Black and White Police Officers, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 516 (2004).
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ocratic elections of leadership, are supposed to temper the tendency
toward oligarchy and to make the union leadership responsive to the
disparate views of the members.422 Yet, as labor scholars have long
observed, oligarchy remains a significant issue for many unions, and
police unions are no exception.423 But the problem is not simply oligarchy, in the sense of control of the union by a few, but also that
union leadership in many cities seems unresponsive to the segment of
the rank-and-file who favor greater engagement with minority communities especially. For example, as discussed above, in a number of
circumstances union leadership’s embrace of reform elicited a threat
from a segment of the membership to vote the reformers out of union
office, as happened in Seattle.424 A Boston Police Department veteran
noted that “[u]nion leaders who might seek a collaborative role with
management in facilitating reform would not be re-elected to office.”425 Alternatively, progressive forces within police departments
have struggled with more regressive union leadership. NYPD officers
attempted to oust PBA President Lynch after his hostile comments
following the killings of Eric Garner and others, but they were unsuccessful.426 Empowering a minority union might either goad the majority union into supporting reform or provide an alternate channel for
reform-oriented officers to meet and confer with management about
reform with legal protection from retaliation for doing so.
Third, minority unionism might address the major criticisms of
public employee unions. One criticism is that they are not responsive
to the views of the full range of public employees and they promote
422 See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127, 127–28 (1992).
423 The classic work on democracy and oligarchy in union governance is SEYMOUR MARTIN
LIPSET, MARTIN A. TROW & JAMES S. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1956). A more recent
discussion of the anomalous features of union governance is Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a
Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169 (2015). See also Catherine L. Fisk, Workplace
Democracy and Democratic Worker Organizations: Notes on Worker Centers, 17 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 101, 106–07, 107 n.17, 113–16 (2016) (collecting and discussing other sources).
424 See supra notes 341–48 and accompanying text (referencing ouster of Seattle police
union President Smith).

R

425 Karoliszyn, supra note 9 (quoting Tom Nolan, a twenty-seven-year veteran of the Boston Police Department and current professor of criminology at Merrimack College).

R

426 See Alan Feuer, Patrick Lynch, Police Union Chief Who Fought de Blasio, Wins a 5th
Term, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/nyregion/patrick-lynch-reelected-to-lead-new-york-police-union.html?_r=0; Andres Jauregui, Coalition of NYC Cops Seek
Ouster of ‘Arrogant’ PBA President Patrick Lynch, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2015, 10:24
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/21/patrick-lynch-nyc-pba-boss-arrogant_n_65
15016.html.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841837

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-3\GWN302.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 70

13-JUL-17

POLICE UNIONS

13:34

781

bad governance.427 Another is that public employees and governments
agree to terms that are not in the public interest because taxpayers are
not represented in bargaining and public employee unions are a special interest with disproportionate influence in the political process;
unions are able to get legislators and executive branch officials elected
and to lobby for legislation (e.g., the construction of more prisons or
harsher criminal sentences) that increase employment. Empirical support for and modeling that attempts to prove this argument exist, but
the evidence is mixed.428
These criticisms were explored in a classic work written early in
the development of public sector unions, using the example of police.
Clyde Summers, a thoughtful scholar of labor law and a proponent of
the benefits of unionization, observed that government employee collective bargaining is a political policymaking process and that the bargaining process and the subjects over which public employees bargain
should be regulated by law to produce a desirable political framework
in which to make policy decisions.429 Discussing police disciplinary
procedures, Summers postulated that a police union “probably represents the consensus of” officers in negotiating to foreclose public review of discipline.430 He suggested that a public review board perhaps
ought not be subject to bargaining, because there would not be a fair
airing of all sides of the issue.431 A public review board, he said, is
unlikely to be opposed by “those interested in more police protection,” or by “the chief of police and the police commissioners who sit
on the employer’s side of the bargaining table,” and in bargaining between the union and the brass, no one represents the interests of
“those who fear that policemen will act abusively or unlawfully and
that their superiors will not take appropriate disciplinary action.”432
427 See DISALVO, supra note 16 (criticizing public sector unions); see also Summers, supra
note 151; Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1109, 1126 (1969) (proposing that the constitutional
nondelegation doctrine limit collective bargaining over certain public policy matters so that policy will “be made solely on the basis of the judgment of a designated official”). Even the staunch
defenders of public sector unionism acknowledge the potential for it to affect the democratic
process. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 441, 445–47 (2003).
428 See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Mohammad Khan, Undermining or Promoting
Democratic Government? An Economic and Empirical Analysis of the Two Views of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in American Law, 14 NEV. L.J. 414, 424 (2014).
429 See generally Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective,
83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974).
430 Id. at 1196.
431 See id. at 1197.
432 Id. at 1196–97.
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Thus, he concluded, collective bargaining “does not provide an appropriate political process for full discussion of the issue or for weighing
and reconciling the competing interests.”433 The labor law doctrinal
response to the Summers argument would be to declare that citizen
review boards are not a permissible subject of bargaining so that
neither management nor the union could negotiate away the public’s
right to review some police policies.
Yet, for the reasons given above and in the literature on other
forms of institutional reform, limiting the power of a police union by
simply taking some issues off the negotiating table is not a solution to
the problem of police misconduct. It is essential to marshal the support of the labor force to implement policy, and the more discretion,
skill, and expertise is required for the work, the more important it is to
ensure that police officers at the bottom of the organization are given
an opportunity to voice their ideas and concerns. Moreover, the evidence from states that prohibit public employee bargaining does not
suggest that having no union produces less police abuse.434
The questions of accountability of police officers to the public
and police union leadership to the members exist even where there is
no institutionalized collective bargaining, as in North Carolina.435 In
North Carolina, which prohibits governments from collectively bargaining with organizations representing public employees, the FOP,
which claims 6,000 members among city police departments statewide,
decided to endorse the Republican candidate for governor because
the Democratic candidate, who was the North Carolina Attorney
General, brought criminal charges against a Charlotte-Mecklenburg
police officer who shot an unarmed Black man in 2013.436 The absence
Id. at 1197.
See Reuben Fischer-Baum & Carl Bialik, Blacks Are Killed by Police at a Higher Rate in
South Carolina and the U.S., FIVETHIRYEIGHT (Apr. 8, 2015, 7:08 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.
com/datalab/blacks-are-killed-at-a-higher-rate-in-south-carolina-and-the-u-s/; see also Gary A.
Harki, Norfolk Police Have Shot and Killed Twice as Many People as Any Other Agency in
Virginia Since 2010. Why?, VIRGINIAN-PILOT: COURTS & CRIME (May 1, 2016), http://piloton
line.com/news/local/crime/norfolk-police-have-shot-and-killed-twice-as-many-people/article_7ec
82615-67e3-5668-bfa4-928bdc4a3874.html (discussing police violence in Virginia); Spirit of
Stokes’ Comments: Black Life Matters, Too, MISSISSIPPI NAACP (Jan. 7, 2016), http://
naacpms.org/category/police-brutality/ (discussing police violence in Mississippi).
435 The most thoughtful analysis of the operation of public sector unions in states that do
not recognize public sector bargaining is Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The
Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735
(2009). We have not found a sustained effort to explain whether or why police misconduct is less
pervasive than in comparable states with unionized police forces in the literature critiquing police unions and police union contracts.
436 Michael Gordon & Jim Morrill, Lingering Anger Over Kerrick Case Boils Up in N.C.
433
434
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of institutionalized negotiating relationships in North Carolina means
that the decision about whom the FOP will endorse is perhaps one of
the most important things that the FOP decides. There is no legal obstacle to police officers forming other groups to represent a different
point of view and collect contributions from their members to spend
on political activity. But the absence of such a tradition, and the absence of institutional support for such organizations in the states that
do allow public employee bargaining, give the FOP the practical ability to “speak for” all North Carolina police officers in the way news
organizations cover the event. What if there were an alternative organization that could rally the members and engage in discussions
with management over an alternative point of view?437 To create such
an institutional mechanism without producing a cacophony of voices
and chaos in negotiations would require some mechanism to cause
organizations to merge or form coalitions in order to match the leverage a long-established police union can exert. How that can be done is
described below.
B. A Form of Members-Only Bargaining
One old criticism of unions that has gained recent support, especially among conservatives and libertarians, asserts that collective bargaining by a union chosen by the majority violates the rights of the
minority who disagree with the union’s position.438 This objection to
unions has particular salience in the case of police unions, especially in
departments where officers disagree about how to police minority
communities and whether arrests for certain relatively minor offenses
serve the public interest. While, for the moment, public employee unions chosen by the majority remain the exclusive representative of all
employees in the bargaining unit, the recent litigation and legislative
Governor’s Race, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 16, 2016, 6:11 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/
news/politics-government/election/article96030727.html. The Democratic candidate won the
election, though much of the coverage of the election focused on the Republican governor’s
support for H.B. 2, a bill that critics assailed as institutionalizing legal discrimination against
LGBT people. See Richard Fausset, Pat McCrory, North Carolina Governor, Concedes After
Acrimonious Race, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/us/north-car
olina-governor.html.
437 In Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), a reverse discrimination challenge to New
Haven’s decision to discard the results of tests that had a disparate impact on Black firefighters’
chances for promotion, the firefighters’ union opposed the department’s decision to discard the
test results. See id. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This is another example of how a union can
hurt members of minority groups in ways other than through collective bargaining.
438 See SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE
NEW RIGHT 2 (2014); Estlund, supra note 423, at 173–74.
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efforts to dramatically curtail bargaining rights of government workers have invited consideration of alternative models.439
One model is members-only union representation with some kind
of proportional representation rule. This type of system existed for
some government employees prior to the development of modern
public sector labor law. California, for example, had a proportional
representation system for some public employees from 1961, when it
enacted its first public sector labor law statute, to 1976, when it
adopted new public sector labor statutes providing for exclusive representation.440 The Winton Act,441 as the old statute was known, did not
allow public employers to recognize an exclusive bargaining representative chosen by the majority.442 Instead, employee councils consisting
of representatives from the gamut of employee organizations were authorized to meet with employers.443 These councils were ostensibly to
save time for government agencies, allowing them to hear all opinions
at once.444 The council included representatives from employees in the
form of organization representatives or even individuals.445 The Act
permitted the majority-employee organization to articulate the official
position of the employees, but provided a forum for other minority
organization representatives and individuals to express points of
view.446
The suggestions gleaned from these council meetings were handled by the employer agency (i.e., the school board, because the Winton Act applied to teachers).447 The employer had the legal right
439 See generally Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1083 (2016) (per curiam)
(affirming by equally divided Court legality of union opt-out regime); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct.
2618, 2623 (2014) (holding that the First Amendment does not permit “a State to compel personal care providers to subsidize speech on matters of public concern by a union that they do not
wish to join or support”).
440 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3500–3511 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). The
Winton Act was enacted in 1965 and covered only public school teachers. The Brown Act, which
covered other government employees, operated slightly differently. The systems are explained in
Darrell Johnson, Note, Collective Bargaining and the California Public Teacher, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 340 (1969). They were replaced by four statewide public sector labor laws, including the
MMBA which established collective bargaining rights for county and municipal employees (including county sheriffs and city police). See generally Joseph R. Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1999).
441 Winton Act, 1965 Cal. Stat. 4660.
442 See Grodin, supra note 440, at 718–19.
443 Johnson, supra note 440, at 355–56.
444 Id.
445 Id.
446 Id. See generally Grodin, supra note 440, at 732.
447 Johnson, supra note 440, at 354.
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under the Winton Act to make the final decision on all matters.448 The
Act recommended that employers incorporate agreed-upon items into
written resolutions, regulations, or policies, but these directives were
implemented in various ways across the state, and council procedures
differed from one city, county, or school district to another.449
This proportional representation system was replaced in California in 1976, and in other states by the early 1970s, for a variety of good
reasons. It was far from ideal. It was expensive and cumbersome. It
did not provide an organized system for shared decisionmaking between government employees and public administrators because decisionmaking authority was left in the hands of the government
agency.450 It instead generated conflict among different groups of employees and it was an obstacle to uniform policies across governmental units.451
Majority rule through exclusive representation, in contrast, can
be more efficient as a system of governance, which is why it is the rule
in every democracy. But, sticking with political analogies, many parliamentary democracies have governance systems that involve multiple
parties that form coalitions to create a majority, and that might be a
pattern worth considering for police unions if the concern is that
union leadership are systematically excluding voices within the rankand-file.
A variety of issues would need to be addressed, depending on
how radical a change in the existing system of representation a state
chose to adopt. If officers chose not to belong to the existing union, in
the twenty-two states that allow employers and unions to negotiate
contracts requiring payment of agency fees to a recognized labor organization,452 would employees be obligated to pay an agency fee to
the majority union or could they instead pay fees to their own? Would
the majority union retain the duty of fair representation to all represented employees or only some duty to its members?453 Would the
Id.
See id.
450 See Catherine Fisk, Challenge to ‘Fair Share’ Union Fees Unfair and Unworkable, EDUC.
WK.: ON CAL. (Oct. 6, 2015, 5:12 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/on_california/2015/10/
challenge_to_fair_share_union_fees_unfair_and_unworkable.html.
451 Id.
452 See Right to Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK: LEGAL DEF. FOUND., http://
www.nrtw.org/right-to-work%20states [https://perma.cc/NHV2-GGL7] (last visited Mar. 29,
2017) (listing the states that have enacted legislation prohibiting contracts requiring payment of
fair share fees).
453 See, e.g., Fisk & Sachs, supra note 153, at 858.
448
449
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same collective bargaining agreement apply to all officers or only to
the members?
For the moment, a modest change is the best course of action
because it is the only one that might conceivably be adopted (as legislative change is likely necessary), because it might allow beneficial
changes without destroying the police unions that function well, and
because incremental changes might allow governments to assess the
impact and unintended consequences and make corrections before
completely upending existing bargaining agreements and personnel
practices. To prevent undue disruption to existing unions and bargaining relationships, the same principles of dues and fees as exist under
current law would apply, as would the duty of fair representation and
all the labor law that turns on the duty of fair representation. All that
would change is the department would have the duty to meet and confer with a minority union provided it demonstrated a minimum level
of support—say, membership of twenty percent or more of the officers in the department. The minimum threshold of support would,
ideally, minimize the burden on police departments to meet and confer with too many groups and would provide incentives for groups of
employees to band together to make their voices heard.
The scope of that duty to meet and confer would extend to any
topic relating to conditions of police employment other than terms in
the existing contract. In labor law terms, the duty to confer would
cover matters of policy that are not mandatory subjects of bargaining
under existing law. The purposes of this limit are several. It would
theoretically reduce majority union opposition to the proposal. It
would avoid destabilizing existing bargaining agreements and the department’s and government’s budget expectations resting on them. It
would prevent departments from cutting officer pay and benefits by
trading off responsiveness to minority unions about policing practices
and community relations for economic and job protections enjoyed by
all officers. The purpose of this limited duty to confer is to create an
institutional mechanism for police officers to be involved in policymaking and problem solving.454 That is why the scope of the new
454 This proposal might look a bit like what has been happening in Missouri since 2007,
when the Missouri Supreme Court declared public employees have a state constitutional right to
bargain collectively even though the state lacks statutory regimes for union representation and
bargaining. Indep.-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 133 (Mo. 2007) (en
banc). See generally MALIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 413–56. Some cities have adopted systems
providing for selection of an exclusive bargaining representative chosen by a majority, as under
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). See, e.g., Howard Wright, City
Can Establish Rules for Decertification of Police Union, MISSOURI PUB. POL’Y & L. (May 24,
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duty omits the wages and working conditions as to which public sector
labor law currently imposes a duty to bargain. But it is not intended to
weaken the economic and disciplinary protections for which police unions have bargained.
The proposal resembles some that have been made for the reform
of teaching, another area of public sector employment with high union
density and substantial controversy about whether unionization serves
the interests of the government employees and the public.455 It also
more generally resembles proposals to create institutions of labormanagement cooperation that have been made many times for different industries in that it provides a framework for collective discussion
of issues of mutual concern outside the context of union-management
negotiations over wages and working conditions.456 It echoes criticisms
of labor law scholars, including Martin Malin and Joseph Slater, concerning the scope of the duty to meet and confer in the public sector.457 According to Professor Malin, there is a lot of evidence that
when workers, through their unions, are given a voice in areas where
they have no right to bargain, the union’s role is transformed and better policies result. For example, when school boards unilaterally impose performance standards, it is not a surprise that unions do what
they can to protect teachers from adverse actions based on failing to
meet those standards. When school boards opt instead to work with
the union to develop those standards and use peer review to implement them, the unions become the protectors of the standards rather
2016), https://momunicipallaw.com/2016/05/24/city-can-establish-rules-for-decertification-of-po
lice-union/ (discussing St. Louis Police Department). Some issues common to other labor law
regimes have arisen, including, for example, proposals to make it more difficult for unions to
collect dues from members. See Jason Hancock, Missouri Republicans Fail to Override Veto of
Union Legislation, KANSAS CITY STAR: BUZZ (May 13, 2016, 1:19 AM), http://www.kansascity.
com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article77382392.html. But without a statewide bargaining law, Missouri would be free to adopt an approach to union representation and bargaining that departs from the usual majority rule and exclusive representation regime, although it
does not appear that Missouri or any of its political subdivisions have done so yet.
455 See generally Madeline L. Sims, Note, The Business of Teaching: Can a New Contract
Change the Culture?, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 605 (2015) (proposing reforms to teachers’
union negotiations, including an expansion of subjects of bargaining, as a part of school reform,
and arguing that outright elimination of teachers’ unions or narrowing the subjects of bargaining
will not improve education).
456 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE: FINAL REPORT 1–12 (1996), https://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/reich/reports/worktogether/working.
pdf.
457 See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369,
1370 (2009); Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know “What a Labor Union Is”: How State
Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public Sector Labor Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
981, 1032 (2000).
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than knee-jerk opponents. Union involvement in teacher peer review
leads to greater levels of attrition among poor performers than traditional methods of principal observation and discipline or dismissal for
failure to meet the standards.458
A similar phenomenon occurred in the 1990s, when President
Clinton by Executive Order created partnership councils and thereby
spurred the creation of a very successful partnership between the Customs Service459 and the National Treasury Employees Union that represented customs agents.460 Data showed a substantial improvement in
job performance, even by metrics such as increased drug and currency
seizures.461 Similar results were seen in Oakland, when the police department developed a peer review system for reviewing officer uses of
force.462 As indicated above, during the pendency of the project the
department experienced a reduction in officer use of force.463
This proposal also incorporates suggestions that labor law scholars have made to incorporate identity-based groups into unionized
workplaces as a way of ensuring that the majority union does not systematically overlook the interests of minorities.464 Officers could belong both to the minority union and to the majority union so that they
would not have to give up the benefits of majority union membership,
including the ability to vote on leadership and contract ratification
458 See Malin, supra note 457, at 1393–94; Charles Taylor Kerchner & Julia E. Koppich,
Organizing Around Quality: The Frontiers of Teacher Unionism, in CONFLICTING MISSIONS?
TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 281, 290–91 (Tom Loveless ed., 2000).
459 The entity now known as the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection was formerly
known as the Customs Service. See CBP Through the Years, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
https://www.cbp.gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/6BQ3-YQ8P] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
460 U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP: A REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT (2000), http://www.opm.gov/lmr/report.
461 Malin, supra note 457, at 1396. A variation is the Minnesota law creating a meet and
confer process for professional employees, although it allows for only a single representative.
MINN. STAT. § 179A.08 (2015).
462 See Sklansky, supra note 80, at 30.
463 See supra Section III.A (discussing Chief Gain and his collaboration with Hans Toch).
464 See, e.g., Michael Selmi & Molly S. McUsic, Difference and Solidarity: Unions in A
Postmodern Age, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 429, 433–34 (Joanne
Conaghan et al. eds., 2002); see also Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1313, 1322–23 (2002); Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 211, 224–29 (2002); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, “Labor’s Divided
Ranks”: Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1599–1601 (1999);
Ruben J. Garcia, New Voices at Work: Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor
Movement, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 102–12 (2002); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution
in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 149, 159–62 (1993); Maria
L. Ontiveros, A New Course for Labour Unions: Identity-Based Organizing as a Response to
Globalization, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra, at 417, 422–24.
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and the right to receive insurance and legal representation paid for by
union dues. Officers also could gain the benefits of membership in the
minority union, principally the ability to have a voice in the minority
union’s governance and priority-setting policies.
This proposal solves many of the unique problems associated
with police unions in the quest for reform. Police unions have been
isolated from the rest of the labor movement in many ways, but particularly in their disconnectedness from the social movement unionism
principles and practices that have reinvigorated many other unions. A
police minority group that shares a self-interest with Black Lives Matter or Moral Mondays is ideally situated to start trying to transform
the culture of the police department and the police union. A minority
union might find allies among the activists of Black Lives Matter and
other groups, which might empower the minority union to stand up to
what might be considerable pressure from the police union. That is a
type of protection for whistleblowing that simply cannot be legislated
or enforced by contract. And it might create momentum that would
attract quiescent dissenters from among the rank-and-file to abandon
their reflexive support for the union and its defense of miscreant
officers.465
C. Will This Version of Members-Only Unionism Weaken Public
Sector Unions? And Is That a Bad Thing?
There are certain large and small objections to any proposal to
adopt any form of members-only bargaining, even one as minor as
this. We address two clusters of the most important objections below.
One major concern is that the proposal does too little. It is not
clear that adopting this limited duty to meet and confer with minority
organizations will change very much. Police officers have shown themselves to be quite loyal to their unions.466 This proposal leaves the majority union in charge of the economic contract terms and the
disciplinary system, at least in the jurisdictions where the disciplinary
system is in the contract rather than written into statute.467 These are
465 There are precedents for this. As noted above, in Los Angeles, the police union
partnered with a civil rights lawyer and law professor to investigate the Rampart scandal precisely because they feared the union and individual officers would be scapegoated for a larger
problem, and other unions have tried to build bridges to civilian groups to stave off attacks on
the union See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
466 See discussion supra Section I.C.
467 See discussion supra Section IV.B (regarding the nature of the proposal) and Section
II.A (describing police discipline).
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the two top priorities for police,468 and the disciplinary system is the
biggest concern of police reformers.469 Moreover, many protections
are written into statutes, and no system of union representation will
change that unless the majority union is weakened to the point that it
cannot block legislative change.470 But the modesty of this proposal
should be seen as a feature rather than a bug, at least to those who
favor some reform but fear that radical change is either politically impossible or would wreak havoc on public employee labor relations and
thereby do more harm than good. As a modest development, it would
not change too much too fast, which might allow for innovation in the
fertile pockets of progressive police activism that do exist without destabilizing existing bargaining relationships in departments that are
not already dysfunctional.
A second major concern is that the minority union would be easily undermined. Given the radioactive nature of some of the issues the
minority union might wish to discuss with management—e.g., civilian
review boards, the officers’ practice of “huddling” before making reports on violence, racial disparities in arrests for minor infractions471—
a minority union would face considerable pressure from the majority
union and its members unlike those faced by other caucuses within
unionized workplaces. In some low-wage workers’ unions, for example, few members of the union show up at meetings (because union
meetings take free time that many workers juggling jobs and family do
not have) and many probably do not care much about non-core contractual issues.472 But one can imagine police having intense interest in
468 See supra Section I.C.1 (discussing goals for members in collective bargaining
agreements).
469 For example, Professor Rushin labels as problematic seven features of union contracts
or statutes, all of which concern the investigation and handling of discipline: (1) delays in interrogating officers suspected of misconduct; (2) giving officers access to evidence before interrogation; (3) limiting consideration of or supervisor access to disciplinary history; (4) limiting length
of interrogation; (5) limits on the investigation of anonymous complaints; (6) limits on civilian
oversight of discipline; and (7) allowing arbitration of disputed disciplinary sanctions. See
Rushin, supra note 20, at 1220 fig.1.
470 See discussion supra Section II.A.
471 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (civilian review boards); supra notes 184–86
and accompanying text (“huddling”); supra note 9 and accompanying text (racial disparities in
arrests).
472 See Meeting Attendance Rule in Utility Workers Local Disqualifies Reform Candidates,
ASS’N FOR UNION DEMOCRACY, https://uniondemocracy.org/meeting-attendance-rule-in-utilityworkers-local-disqualifies-reform-candidates/ (last visited May 11, 2017); Nazgol Ghandnoosh,
Organizing Workers Along Ethnic Lines: The Pilipino Workers’ Center, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE 49, 55 (Ruth Milkman, Joshua Bloom & Victor Narro eds., 2010) (noting difficulty of identifying workers and persuading them to take the risk and time to become involved in a worker
organization).
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these non-core contractual issues. Once minority unions have real
power, unlike the minority caucuses now, it is easy to imagine a police
minority union being quickly co-opted or sabotaged by internal union
confederates. Minority unions would, under this proposal, have the
right and responsibility to discuss contentious issues, like use of force,
statistical measures of police productivity, and other policing tactics
that have become extremely divisive. One could imagine officers who
are hostile to reform having intense interest in preventing the minority union from persuading management to make any significant
changes. Officers opposed to reform might sign up en masse to join
the minority union precisely to take it over and kill it. Or minority
union members might face intense pressure to defect to the majority
union so that the minority union would dissolve.
There are ways to design a minority union system to address
these concerns. Perhaps minority union membership could be confidential, leaving the job of physically meeting and conferring with the
brass to the most courageous few who felt they could publicly stand
the pressure. Or the minority union might rely on the labor law principles that have allowed unions to fire stewards when they believe the
steward has become ideologically opposed to the union.473 Public sector labor law in most jurisdictions already protects union activists
from retaliation or harassment,474 and such protection would need to
be extended to supporters of the minority union as well as the majority union.
To the extent that a system of representation gained traction, it
could produce the kind of chaos and cacophony that led to criticisms
of the proportional representation system in California before 1976.475
It could lead to expensive and slow discussions rather than any real
change in policy. Management could play the two unions off against
each other, thus weakening both. Those concerns could be ameliorated by careful design. The system could be limited to just one majority and one minority union.
Moreover, to the extent that the change gave a minority union
power to negotiate any kind of binding agreement on any terms currently subject to the duty to bargain with the exclusive representative,
some complex problems would arise. Courts or public employee rela473 See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2153–54 (Gwynne A. Wilcox et al. eds., 6th ed. 2014
& Supp. 2015).

See generally MALIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 428–50.
See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 440, at 728 (describing the uncertainty under the Brown
Act as to with whom the public employer was obligated to meet and confer).
474
475

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841837

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-3\GWN302.txt

792

unknown

Seq: 81

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

13-JUL-17

13:34

[Vol. 85:712

tions boards would have to decide how to recalibrate the mandatory
subjects of bargaining to enable participation of the minority union.
Significantly, they would have to decide whether discipline remains a
mandatory subject of bargaining, because so much of the controversy
over police violence focuses on the appropriate disciplinary process. If
it is, they would have to determine how to allow the minority union to
play a role in negotiation over the disciplinary system. If the minority
union were empowered to be at the bargaining table over design of
the disciplinary system, then questions would arise over how to involve the minority union in the interest arbitration or fact-finding process that often resolves bargaining disputes over mandatory subjects
of bargaining.
D. The Benefits of the Proposal Outweigh the Risks
The advantage this proposal has over most others being offered is
that this one has the possibility of garnering support from some rankand-file police officers who are dissatisfied with their union but see a
wholesale assault on police unionism as worse than the status quo. Of
course, if even the mildest version of this proposal were offered as
legislation, it may be impossible to enact or implement, precisely to
the extent it would weaken extant unions. In 2011, when Wisconsin
eliminated bargaining rights for most public sector employees, it did
not eliminate such rights for public safety employees.476 Ohio, in contrast, tried to eliminate bargaining for every public employee and the
voters repealed the law by referendum.477 Both of these are reminders
of the power of public safety unions even in climates that have a
strong antiunion strain.
Advocates of the benefits of police unions to police reform in the
1960s insisted that police unions could train officers in the values of
democracy and could remedy the alienated and repressive mentality
of the police by “involving as many policemen as possible in decision
making on all aspects of the department’s job.”478 Creating an institutional mechanism that gives space for minority unions to voice their
concerns would create incentives for existing unions to account for
476 Act of Mar. 11, 2011, 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 23; see Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker,
705 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting equal protection challenge to Act 10’s exclusion of
some employees from statutory right to bargain); Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d
337, 347 (Wis. 2014) (same).
477 See Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 693.
478 WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW,
CUSTOM, AND MORALITY xvii (1970); see also GEORGE E. BERKLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC POLICEMAN 29–39 (1969).
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these opposing views. This might facilitate the development of the values of “trust, cooperation, communication, . . . leadership, . . . [and]
respect.”479 Working through inevitable disagreements would provide
opportunities for officers to learn these important values.480 Officers
might gain maturity, patience, and tolerance for different points of
view that can translate into better relationships and engagements with
the communities they serve.481 Additionally, deliberating through disputes and coming to a successful resolution will involve creativity and
problem solving; skills that are consonant with abilities they will have
to develop to successfully engage in community policing.482
The reasons for encouraging a multitude of voices in reform-oriented policymaking is not simply to increase buy-in and reduce resistance. Rather, their contributions can help make the reforms
themselves more effective.483 There are two reasons for this. First,
policymakers both within and outside the department often believe
that their expertise makes them better equipped than the rank-andfile to determine what reforms are necessary and how best to bring
them to fruition. They may be completely unaware of their own limitations and information gaps. This “fallacy of expertise”484 causes
policymakers to overlook the benefits of obtaining input from the individuals who will be tasked with executing their vision.485
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 98, at 25.
Political scientist William Ker Muir concludes that “an enjoyment of talk” is a quality of
good policemen, because officers who can handle “the contradiction of achieving just ends with
coercive means,” can avoid isolation and add to their “repertoire[s] of potential responses to
violence.” WILLIAM K. MUIR, POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS 4 (1977).
481 See Wuestewald & Steinheider, supra note 55, at 54 (noting that rank-and-file graduates
of the Leadership Program gained maturity, were groomed for leadership such that a disproportionate number have achieved promotions, and continued to remain “consistently . . . more engaged in city and community issues generally. The communications and interpersonal skills
individuals learn and apply in the process of making collaborative, department-wide decisions
has a maturing affect [sic] on those involved.”).
482 George L. Kelling et al., supra note 54, at 272 (“Often, management’s attempt to manage culture through command and control merely fosters suspicion, isolation, insularity, demeaning perception of citizens, grumpiness, the ‘blue curtain,’ and cynicism.”) (citing PETER K.
MANNING, POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING (1979)); see also Edwin
Meese III, Community Policing and the Police Officer, in COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 41,
at 297, 310 (“It is unlikely that improved communication will occur between police officers and
citizens if effective communication within the department has not been established first.”).
483 Wuestewald & Steinheider, supra note 55, at 54 (noting that when shared leadership
was employed in Oklahoma, accepting the decisions made by the group “were usually vindicated
because they proved to be sound choices based on the firsthand knowledge and insights of those
closest to the work”).
484 Bevir & Krupicka, supra note 377, at 171.
485 Id. at 172 (“All too often the reformers have not recognized the particularity of their
own narrative, the importance of including actual police officers in the policy development pro479

R

480
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However, as previously discussed, rank-and-file officers will have
insights to share based upon their day-to-day engagement in street
policing. Involving top command in policymaking is not an adequate
substitute for the expertise and knowledge of the rank-and-file because high-level police managers might have lost touch with changed
circumstances on the street. Furthermore, top command officers may
be disconnected from the actual experiences of officers on the street
and thus may be unaware of the challenges posed by the reform to
street officers’ daily work. It would be more efficient to identify these
issues prior to implementation rather than after policies and procedures have been changed.
The second reason to create mechanisms to ensure that a multitude of voices are heard is that involvement of the rank-and-file in
decisionmaking can help mitigate inevitable misunderstandings and
miscommunications that occur when new policies are explained to
them. The rank-and-file will undoubtedly encounter unexpected
problems during the process of implementation. This “implementation
gap”486 can occur even if officers are attempting to apply the reform in
good faith. Policymakers cannot anticipate every circumstance that officers will confront when they attempt to put a new policy into practice. Thus, they cannot possibly create rules that govern every
situation.487 As a consequence, officers inevitably interpret and modify
policy.488 This process of interpretation can have both unforeseen and
unintended consequences not contemplated by the reformers.489 Also,
if officers were not involved in conceiving the policy, they may not
appreciate its goals and intent. Hence, their choices and judgments
will not be informed by a deep understanding of the policy’s purpose.
As a result of the implementation gap, policies may not work as
reformers intended, even when the rank-and-file are doing their best
to abide by them. If the rank-and-file are not given a voice, reformers
may not find out about the problems. Furthermore, top command and
policymakers may attribute the gap between theory and practice to
cess, or the variable and open-ended nature of the cultures and actions within which and to
which the reforms will have to apply.”).
486 Id. at 171; see also BROWN, supra note 60, at 22 (noting that the “politics of implementation” affect the outcomes of policies).
487

Bevir & Krupicka, supra note 377, at 171.

488

Id. at 170.

489 Id. (“Crucially, when the police interpret the reforms, they transform them, resisting
them or domesticating them in ways that have consequences unforeseen and certainly unintended by the advocates of the reforms.”).
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rank-and-file obstinacy.490 In response, top command may increase
rank-and-file surveillance in order to control their behavior and punish them for transgressions, not realizing that the problems are due to
their own inability to anticipate how the policy would actually work in
practice.491 Ironically, this increased surveillance and control can lead
to resistance that may not have existed in the first place.492
Thus, the failure to involve the rank-and-file not only deprives
the reform of being more effective, but it may also have the unintended effect of generating resistance, as reformers attribute the failure of the policy solely to rank-and-file resistance. Two scholars
observe,
All too often, . . . this whole process becomes reiterative. The
reforms meet with police skepticism, the way the police respond to them generates unintended consequences, the negative consequences then inspire another set of reforms that
again meets with local skepticism, and so on.
The continuous process of reform soon will reach . . . a
point where police are so weary of reform that they become
increasingly immovable. Constant reform undermines morale and breeds ever-greater skepticism about reform.493
Engaging the rank-and-file in policymaking could help to avoid
some of the problems caused by the fallacy of expertise and the implementation gap. With involvement, rank-and-file officers could make
reformers aware of the challenges posed by the policies, both ex ante
and ex post. Rank-and-file officers inevitably make policy on the
street through their day-to-day interactions with the public.494 Involving the rank-and-file in formal policymaking might enhance the effectiveness of the reform by improving information flows and rank-andfile compliance.495
This proposal can also help to change the notoriously entrenched
culture of police departments.496 Research suggests that people often
490

Id. at 171.

Id.
Allen, supra note 52, at 94 (“[C]lose supervision and productivity are negatively correlated.”) (citation omitted); Toch, supra note 54, at 63 (“Actions inspired by mistrust tend to
breed resentment, which fuels obduracy and resistance. Resistance reinforces suspicion, which
incites intrusive monitoring moves, which breed resentment. And so the cycle continues . . . .”).
493 Bevir & Krupicka, supra note 377, at 170.
494 Allen, supra note 52, at 93.
495 See Bevir & Krupicka, supra note 377, at 176 (“Perhaps a more bottom-up approach to
police reform will bring greater success in implementing reforms.”).
496 See supra Part II.
491
492
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engage in behaviors that they believe others are also engaged in.497 In
other words, people imitate those around them. Psychologists refer to
this as “social proof.”498 However, often assumptions about another’s
beliefs are based on inaccurate information.499 One way to overcome
mistaken beliefs about what others are thinking is to make other views
salient and public. Minority union representation will show rank-andfile officers that their potentially more open-minded and progressive
views are shared by others. Additionally, this minority unionism
would give outside reformers the opportunity to understand that there
are officers within the department who support their proposals and
this could lead to the forging of partnerships between police reformers
and officers within the department that can facilitate reforms.
Moreover, if decisionmakers are truly considering input from the
rank-and-file, it is likely that the policies that are eventually enacted
will incorporate some of their suggestions. Rank-and-file officers have
knowledge and expertise to share given their familiarity with the
street.500 They will have ideas that policymakers did not consider and
they can also highlight unanticipated problems. Additionally, reformers may be unaware that their ideas as initially proposed are simply
unworkable for a variety of reasons from the mundane to the insurmountable.501 Thus, rank-and-file officers can help fill the gap between theory and practice.
Mechanisms to improve labor-management cooperation are essential to police reform. It is misguided to suggest that the solution is
simply to make it easier for departments to fire or discipline officers
without changing the way that management relates to the rank-andSee JONAH BERGER, CONTAGIOUS: WHY THINGS CATCH ON 128 (2013).
Id.
499 See id. at 130.
500 As one policing scholar notes, the rank and file “often have important insights into the
impediments to more effective policing. . . . [They] have a wealth of unorganized and underutilizing knowledge about which police activities are not working and why. . . . Sadly, this kind of
knowledge is not exploited . . . in shaping strategies . . . .” BAYLEY, supra note 48, at 22 (citation
omitted); see also Herman Goldstein, The New Policing: Confronting Complexity, in COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 41, at 71, 79 (“In rank-and-file officers, there exists an enormous
supply of talent, energy, and commitment that, under quality leadership, could rapidly transform
American policing.”). When shared leadership was employed in Oklahoma, accepting the decisions made by the group “were usually vindicated because they proved to be sound choices
based on the firsthand knowledge and insights of those closest to the work.” Wuestewald &
Steinheider, supra note 55, at 54. Additionally, when “senior managers doubted a Leadership
Team decision . . . yet lent their support regardless, [such instances] became milestones of trust
and confidence for the agency.” Id.
501 Bevir & Krupicka, supra note 377, at 157; see also id. at 170 (noting that the reforms
may not be “a suitable fit with the lived experience of the officers”).
497
498
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file for at least three reasons. First, it may be politically impossible to
significantly reduce contractual or statutory protections for officers
accused of misconduct. Second, and by far more important, even if
every officer who kills a civilian unjustifiably were fired promptly and
criminally prosecuted, it is an empirical question whether police violence would decline through the operation of specific or general deterrence.502 If some number of unjustified police shootings are the result
of poor training or bad management, one puts a great deal of faith in
enlightened police management to assume that eliminating job protections for rank-and-file officers will allow management to dramatically
alter patrol officers’ behavior to better safeguard the public. Even if
police union contracts and statutory LEOBORs were revised to provide a speedier and more transparent disciplinary process that would
make it easier to terminate the employment of officers found to have
used improper force, still policing behavior might not change dramatically if police management encourages practices that lead to excessive
force, arrests for minor infractions, or other kinds of law enforcement
strategies that harm minority communities.
CONCLUSION
The prevailing narrative suggests that rank-and-file officers in
general, and police unions in particular, are obstacles to reforms that
would make policing more transparent, accountable, and legitimate to
the citizenry. While there is certainly strong evidence to support this
view, this Article highlights examples of rank-and-file officers acting
individually, and some unions acting representatively, as key partners
in reform efforts that can improve the quality of policing. The essential question is how to increase the opportunities for officers to be a
positive force for the improvement of police services.
Discussions of the need for police reform understandably focus
on problematic officers and on unions that appear to be irredeemably
opposed to any reform oriented policies. What is lost in these discussions is the recognition of the officers who could be partners in reform
efforts and who do not have a mechanism for making their voices
heard within the department, especially when the police union for
whatever reason either does not support their views or does not take
their views into account. Minority unionism in police departments
502 In this context, as noted above, see supra note 436 and accompanying text, there is no
evidence of less unconstitutional police conduct in jurisdictions like Virginia and North Carolina
that have no public sector bargaining than in jurisdictions that have it.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841837

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-3\GWN302.txt

798

unknown

Seq: 87

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

13-JUL-17

13:34

[Vol. 85:712

gives these officers a voice by creating an institutional mechanism to
ensure that their views are heard.
This proposal expands the duty of management to meet and confer with the police union to include subjects relating to reform. It prevents the minority union from renegotiating the economic terms and
disciplinary system created by the majority union in the collective bargaining agreement or invoking the interest arbitration system used to
resolve bargaining disputes between the majority union and the department. Thus, departments and police unions should support this
reform, as it respects their interests. The proposal, moreover, is built
on successful labor-management partnerships that have been used in
both federal and state systems and that demonstrably improved productivity, morale, and the quality of service provided by government
agencies in which these types of labor-management councils have
been implemented.
Alternative proposals such as increasing public scrutiny of police
discipline and reducing job protections for police officers may not
achieve greater accountability or reduce unwarranted police violence.
While it is important to increase public scrutiny of police actions, doing so will not necessarily further the goals of police accountability.
For instance, civilian members of panels that review the disciplinary
decisions of LAPD Police Chief Beck were “more likely than officers
to oppose the chief’s discipline recommendations.”503 Furthermore, if
eliminating job protections for officers would reduce police violence,
then it should be done. However, this proposal addresses the normative question of what kinds of procedural protections police officers
should have when accused of misconduct.504 Allowing a diverse set of
officers to participate in reform-oriented policymaking would force
the primary union to account for minority voices, force management
to account for a diversity of views, and help management and rankand-file officers to develop trust. Providing them voice and accounting
for their input shows them respect, gives them a sense of ownership,505
503 Editorial, Backers of Police Discipline Change Should Be Careful What They Wish for,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-lapdboard-of-rights-20170111-story.html.
504 As Kate Levine argues, the procedural protections that police have negotiated for in
their union contracts or lobbied for in legislation are a model for how the most troubling aspects
of the criminal justice system should be reformed. Instead of eliminating these protections when
police are suspected of crime, she argues, these protections should be extended to all criminal
suspects. See Levine, supra note 20, at 1202.
505 Bevir & Krupicka, supra note 377, at 173 (“Reformers need to do more to secure prior
buy-in from rank and file officers, or the professional organizations that represent them, if they
want the rank and file to have a sense of ownership over the reforms.”).
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and will likely increase their perceptions of the department’s legitimacy. The benefits of experimenting with giving diverse voices a say
in reform-oriented policymaking is well worth the effort.
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